Page 152 - Echo 127

enemy on our maps. Fortunately, we had a forward air controller, a naval gunfire liaison and artillery liaison’s at the CP. They began to do their jobs and the supporting artillery from 105 MM Howitzers and 155 mm Howitzers began to find their marks in the treeline that camouflaged the enemy fortifications. Orders had been given to hunker down and let artillery and air support do their job. Within minutes the big guns from the U. S. Navy Destroyer, USS Richard B. Anderson , began to make Her presence known and the rounds from those big guns whistled thru the air right on target .@ 54 Then, the guns became silent —on command from the Col.—to allow air support to come in —-enemy firing had eased up as our air support kicked in raking the tree line fortifications with their guns, rockets and bombs and last but not least napalm—our aircraft dropped canister after canister of napalm on the target igniting the entire tree line and the hidden fortifications—the fire was so hot we had to turn our faces downward to avoid the heat —like standing too close to a bonfire. By then the enemy, or what was left was on the run with A Co. and remnants of B Company in pursuit. The aftermath of our attack left VC bodies, body parts and destroyed fortifications—it was obvious that we had destroyed much of the enemy battalion.@ 55 This ‘after action report’ was written by me—as S-2 for the Bn.
The battalion pursued the remnants of the VC for the next two days—A Company and B Company executing their ‘frag’ orders to search for and destroy the remaining enemy—which they did!
The cost of this battle was significant—we had lost 11 Marine KIA and another 50 wounded—the number would’ve been much higher if our artillery, air and
152