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was obvious that many of these people saw us as ‘invaders’ not ‘saviours’—they still remembered the French occupation and simply wanted foreigners out of their Country—something we understood completely in 1966. General Walt had initiated a ‘three pronged strategy’ to accomplish our mission to secure the I Corps. region. @ 59 ( Shulimson ) the three prongs were: Search and Destroy Operations; Counter Guerrilla Operations; Pacification Operations. The ‘Pacification’ effort never really took hold. The strategy to bring medical supplies and treatment to the villages was one of the best parts about his strategy—much good was done throughout the Country in this regard. Another part of the Pacification strategy that did some good was the ‘education/training component’. @ 60 The Vietnamese were introduced to ways to make their drinking water safer, how to grow better crops and various ways to improve their infrastructure .
These efforts were thwarted often by the communist influence in these villages— folks were threatened for participating in these programs—the communist simply did not want the people to be ‘won over’ by the Americans and the S. Vietnamese government.
These operations continued through the Spring of 1966—several operations were launched against the growing number of NVA crossing the DMZ and the South. The NVA had indicated they were willing to lose large numbers of their soldiers to make a statement against our presence there and they were prepared to make us ‘pay’ for that presence by inflicting major casualties on our Marines and the ARVN.
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