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| EU WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE |
Ms Elizabeth Hughes addresses the Delegates and the Military Working Group on the legal status and implications of the WTD
The Department of Justice was not involved at any stage of the negotiations, and this was a fact greeted with surprise by the delegates and guests in the audience. The importance of building trust was emphasised, as was ‘leaving the other fella with his bus fare home’. Most importantly, the speakers stressed the lasting value of an agreed policy, rather than one brought in unilaterally or through regulation, which is brittle and open to legal challenge
Captain Mikael Kenttala showed how the Swedish Navy, through its relatively simple but highly effective workforce planning model safeguards the wellbeing of their workers by ensuring that they receive the required rest outlined in the Directive or are adequately compensated where this is not possible due to unplanned events or exigencies of the service. The Swedish model applies a sliding scale of hours worked, and an increasing scale of financial remuneration allied with compensatory leave to deter employers from overworking their staff.
Captain Andreas Steinmetz described the experiences of the Deutscher BundeswehrVerband (DBwV – German Military Representative Association). He spoke of how in the past, working hours of soldiers were regarded as an almost inexhaustible resource, and this led to a to a massive build-up of hours worked in excess of the WTD provisions, which without compensation could only have been maintained by the soldier’s sense of duty. Captain Steinmetz described the consequences of this irresponsible handling of working hours, which created stress, damaged soldiers’ health and placed an unacceptable burden on family life. He spoke of the requirement for a cultural shift in how working hours were managed, and critically how they came to be viewed as a finite resource, much like fuel or rations.
RACO’s legal advisor Ms Elizabeth Hughes described the legal status of the WTD, and the implications of continued contravention of the legislation. She stressed that the Directive can only be circumvented in certain unavoidable situations through legal derogation, and that these derogations must be provided for through compensatory time off.
There followed a most interesting and thought-provoking panel discussion, where the guest speakers answered a variety of questions from the floor. It was clear to all that the WTD will require a cultural shift in how the Defence Forces conducts its business and will require a degree of sophistication in its planning, which has arguably been missing to date. The speakers left the delegates and Military Management guests in no doubt as to the task ahead, but also demonstrated how with a little effort and ingenuity, the WTD can be introduced as an effective workforce planning tool, enabling efficient and transparent forecasting while giving personnel a clear projection of their future working hours.
The Conference concluded its business by unanimously passing the following motion:
‘RACO calls on the Minister for Defence and the Government to fully implement the provisions of the EU Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC) for the Defence Forces, amend the Organisation of Working Time Act (1997) and thereby ensure the wellbeing, health and safety of military personnel.’
Conclusion
The perceived need of Management to limit the impact of any proposed or existing legislation on operational capability and effectiveness is understood by all. The attractions of blanket exemptions or derogations from law are indeed strong but must not be employed wholesale to the detriment of the wellbeing of DF personnel. The approach adopted by civil and military management since 2011 in seeking to tackle the supposed problem and risks posed by the WTD has yielded only inertia, and the time has come to view the legislation as an opportunity to increase morale and wellbeing among DF personnel, which can only enhance operational effectiveness if managed correctly and resourced adequately.
Ireland has failed in its obligations to adequately transpose this health and safety legislation, and it follows that Defence Sector Management is the epitome of that failure. It has ignored the
34 | | WINTER ‘18 |