Page 105 - Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters

cated within the intra-Asian network: first in Batavia and later at Ceylon. Sailors who had recovered would replace incapacitated crew arriving at a certain trading post; often other staff were placed on board passing vessels. Of course, many of the nautical tasks onboard could be conducted by other staff. However, the safe operation of the fleet was imperative and depended on the presence of sufficient quali- fied staff: sailors that could sail the ship, skippers and navigation officers that had knowledge of the sailing areas and ships carpenters and boatswain that could repair the ship during the voyage. The Witte Beer (ID:) , on route to Asia in  experienced problems due to a lack of specialised crew; the upper-steersman died, the skipper turned out to have no navigational skills at all and those on board had to rely, for a safe voyage, on the accompanying yacht Swarte Beer (ID:) (McLeod a, p. ). Only occasionally did the VOC use the services of local sailors, one example is the ship Wa- pen van Delft that sailed to Batavia in  with a local steersman. The VOC preferred to sail their ships with a European crew and there was never a policy to employ local sailors (NA .., VOC , --). This policy of a European crew in combination with a relatively high mortality rate, forced the VOC to transport large numbers of sailors to Asia and to various posts in the Asian network. Apart from the crew, other passengers were present on board dur- ing most voyages. Soldiers, administrative staff and management were also shipped from the Netherlands and then employed in the many VOC forts and trading posts. Soldiers and other staff were regularly transferred. Military personnel were often moved around in the region in anticipation of military activities. Therefore, the number of people on board the ships in Asia generally exceeded the required crew. Food and supplies for the people on board were an important aspect of the logistical organi- sation of intra-Asian shipping. However, even with a larger number of crew and passengers, it was possible to make almost all voyages within Asia without having to make a stop for food supplies. Only the longer voyages over the Indian Ocean to Surat and Persia and back could be tight (Coolhaas , --). Shortages in drinking water did, however, create problems. The water supply would become critical especially if the ships were used for the transport of Portuguese prisoners or slaves. The ship Den Briel (ID:) had to call at Jortan to take on water when it transported ‘ souls of slaves (male and female) very skinny and poor destined peo- ple’  of which died within a short time (Coolhaas , p. ). The transport of groups of Portuguese prisoners created the same problems, as did the transport of animals like elephants and horses. For the transport of elephants, ships had to make refreshment stops to provide fresh vegetables (Colenbrander , p. ). The large volume of water that had to be trans- ported created a new problem for the VOC: the wooden water-barrels normally used weren’t suitable in the tropics. Asian storage pots (martavans) provided the solution (Stapel , p. ). This type of container is described in the VOC archives and was excavated from the wrecks of the Witte Leeuw (ID:) (Pijl-Ketel ) and the Avondster (ID:) (Parthesius ). In , the Leeuwin (ID:) and the Der Veer (ID:) had to transport  Portuguese prisoners ( male,  female and  children) to Batavia, for the storage of drinking water a ‘fair amount’ of martavans were placed in the hold (NA .., VOC , fol. -). The preparation for and the employment of the required sailors to be sent to Asia to serve on the ships was a logistical challenge that must have been mind-bending for both the directors in the Netherlands and the management in Asia. Before , there was a constant shortage of sailors who remained in Asia with the fleet. The VOC forced sailors to serve longer in Asia than their contract stated. The active policy of Governor-General Coen to establish colonies and to privatise aspects of the Asian shipping network should be seen in the light of this prob- lem (Colenbrander , p.). In , this bottleneck had not been lifted and there was still a shortage of staff for the Asian fleet. Governor-General Brouwer complained that they had an excellent fleet of ships in Asia but that through a lack of staff ‘these marvellous ships can not contribute to the benefits of the VOC and to be detrimental to the enemy’ (Coolhaas , p. ). By the s, the problem with sailors reluctant to stay longer in Asia must have been solved because in , the arriving sailors were returned immediately with the fleet to Europe. At this time, the VOC could not recruit enough sailors in Asia that were prepared to sail back to Europe. There was discussion as to which staff would serve the VOC’s interests best in Asia: the The shipping and logistics in operation 