Page 162 - Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters

of Asian production would be much higher if a realistic calculation was made of the expenses for the transport of the materials and the fee of the Dutch craftsmen working on these projects. Documents from later in the th Century spell out the advantages to the Netherlands local economy of retaining shipbuilding rights ‘\[...\] that it gives work to many people, that the money needed for the construction of such vessels is kept here in the country, rather than send- ing it with many costs and dangers to India’ (Stapel , p. ). Weaving it all into a efficient maritime network The VOC succeeded in setting up an efficient shipping organisation that allowed them to opti- mise the use of their fleet. In contrast with the European competitors and many local traders the VOC designed a system of sailing routes that would make them as independent from the monsoon as possible. Aiming for a flexible system the VOC build an elaborate network of ship- ping and trade connections that allowed them to keep trade circulating continuously. Conse- quently two shipping systems were developed: European-Asian shipping and Intra-Asian shipping. Both systems met in the central VOC headquarters Batavia on West-Java. The foun- dation for this system had been set prior to . An initial base centred around a fleet of ships sent to Asia for a trading-round-tour with some additional (exploration and military) tasks, a permanent organisation was then established on West-Java, with the headquarters at Batavia from . The development of these two shipping systems and the timely convergence at a central rendezvous is a clear example of the complexity of the VOC organisation with its strong ability to adapt to changing circumstances also limited by its specific character. It shows the interdependence of a suitable fleet and an efficient logistical organisation. The two shipping networks were of major influence on each other. As explained in Chapter  the requirements of the Retourvloot had a profound impact on the Intra-Asian network. This is evident in the ship- ping times, where cargo was expected to arrive in Batavia in good time for the return voyage to the Netherlands or in the organisational set-up where the Retourschepen being already partly loaded with bulky cargo items at important destinations in the Asian shipping network before they sailed back via Batavia could also load the smaller quantities of expensive cargo items. On the other hand the moment of the arrival of money and men from Europe in Batavia was deci- sive on the possibilities of commercial and military actions in Asia. This study revealed a high degree of differentiation within the VOC fleet in Asia. In Chapter  ‘fleet to regions’ it is shown that the differentiation of the VOC fleet was even greater at a regional level. Through their finely woven organisation the VOC were able to maintain specia- list vessels for certain purposes even on a local level. In addition they were also able, as indi- cated in the yearly Navale Macht, to assess the quality of a certain vessel and find suitable em- ployment during all the stages of its career. Probably the biggest advantage that this system had to offer was the ability to circumvent the traditional monsoon trade in Asia. The centralised organisation from Batavia allowed the VOC overview of the deployment of the fleet on various routes and the ability to plan Intra-Asian trade activities (and the availability of the associated trade capital). They could therefore avoid longer periods of vessels, staff and trade capital being idle waiting for a changing monsoon season this period of idleness characterised traditional monsoon trade and shipping. Through the availability of vessels of various dimensions the VOC was able to react efficiently to fluctua- tions in the requested or available cargo. The central control from Batavia could have contribu- ted, with the right policy, to the commercial success of the VOC on the Intra-Asian market in the th century. Central control at strategic locations and routes came with a price and required a permanent military presence. The general opinion was that the monopoly on the purchasing of some prod- ucts (mainly spices) and prevention of other European traders shipping products to Europe would eventually compensate the expenses. In the short term the value of the cargo of some captured Iberian vessels rarely covered the expenses of the military operation and the delay or abortion of trade-missions. Only on some occasions, especially in the early period when the Portuguese were still using huge trade vessels, was the booty very large. Preventing the trade  Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters