Page 54 - MERCIAN Eagle 2011

OC
2IC
FST Comd
IO
CSM
Ops WO CQMS
FOB Manager
7 Platoon
OC
Pl Sgt
8 Platoon
OC
Pl Sgt
9 Platoon
OC
Pl Sgt
Maj McKay
Capt Causer
Capt Reid RA
Lt Emslie SCOTS DG WO2 (CSM) Thomson WO2 Price
CSgt Hunter Sgt Howdle
Lt Graves Sgt Moss
Capt Cartwright / Lt Wilson
CSgt O’Gara
Capt Codling Sgt Timperley
Fire Support Group
OC FSp SectionSgt Williams
OC Mortars Sgt Webster JTAC Bdr Pickering RA
52
C Company
It will be no surprise to find that C Company’s year has been dominated by our operational tour in Afghanistan. Deployed as D Company CF Nahr-e-Seraj North,
we occupied Forward Operating Base (FOB) Khar Nikar in the furthest north east of Task Force Helmand’s (TFH) Company areas of operation (AO). Geographically isolated from the main force and located deep in the Upper Gereshk Valley’s (UGV) Green Zone (GZ), we owned battle space originally cleared over a wide area (20 sq km) in 2007, subjected to an effective series of insurgent counter
attacks/influence
operations. Between
then and 2010, before
being cleared again
on a more modest
scale (4 sq km) during
Op HERRICK 13. C
Company inherited a
friendly force area of influence that had 360 degree separation from insurgent influence by a fairly definite forward edge (FEBA) on and beyond which the Company defeated and disrupted insurgent influence activity. Our mission, in brief, was to do Counter Insurgency (COIN); Secure and Deepen the Hold.
Although it is hard to be objective with undefined measures of effect, we know that C Company had a ‘good’ tour. Over the past few years, the various Khar Nikar Companies have more or less been driven back into their FOB each Summer. For a wide variety of reasons, this did not happen to us in 2011; the enemy was beaten back
over a series of nearly 100 small arms contacts and 30 IED incidents, the ground we were tasked to hold was held, an enemy that we were tasked to draw and attrite suffered heavy casualties and was diverted from operations against operationally more important targets, and most importantly,
the local indigenous population of Khar Nikar was protected, understood, and turned (for the most part) to understand and support our operations, while local security and governance structures such as a Local Police Force and a Security Shura
were empowered and enabled.
All this came at a cost, of course. On
the morning of 18
June 11, C Company Tactical Headquarters (Tac HQ) and Number 3 Tolay (Afghan National
Army), our partners from the Afghan Army, deployed to conduct a Surveillance and Target Acquisition patrol north of Khar Nikar. As the task drew to a close, a local national identified an improvised explosive device close to the patrol before another local national, 75 metres away from another friendly force element, was injured by a separate explosion. Soon afterwards, insurgents engaged the Company’s Outer Cordon, and Pte Gareth Bellingham was fatally wounded by small arms fire. Over the next few months, several other members
of the Company were also injured, most seriously: Bdr Michaels from the Fire Support Team to an IED, Pte Southall in 2
THE MERCIAN EAGLE
In many ways, we were lucky, but sometimes you make your own luck
FOB Khar Nikar Memorial Corner including a cross for Pte Bellingham, noting 2 MERCIAN casualties taken on HERRICK 6 in 2007
separate IED explosions amongst his many skirmishes with the enemy, and Cpl Casey who sustained 2 gunshot wounds to the head and helmet late in the tour. Thankfully, all are likely to make almost total recoveries. Of note is that almost every contact with the enemy over the whole tour was fought on our terms, and when compared to those of previous Company Groups that have served in the Khar Nikar Area, our casualty rates were astonishingly and mercifully low. We have the solid foundations of a hard fought winter tour provided for us by Number 2 Company IRISH GUARDS, and the most extraordinary efforts of our own soldiers
to thank for that. In many ways, we were lucky, but sometimes you make your own luck.
C Company’s job in Khar Nikar was
to: re-establish the Village Shura’s, our partnered Tolay’s, and our own authority over the population; isolate that population from the insurgent; and gather the necessary intelligence to eliminate the insurgent where appropriate. By the time we were complete in theatre, the insurgent in central Khar Nikar had been expelled, and static units, in the form of three Section level Observation Posts, a partnered Section
(+) Checkpoint, and a partnered Platoon
(-) Patrol Base, had been deployed. The situation, however, was very fragile, and
the enemy was not at all happy to be losing influence in what was and is considered ground critical to him. With that in mind, our efforts concentrated on what is known as the Find, Feel, Understand and Influence (FFUI) of Local Nationals in Khar Nikar and neighbouring Pasab (patrolled by 8 Platoon). This work included: a confirmation of the Insurgent’s Intent, Narrative, Locations and Routes; a Defeat of his efforts to destabilise Areas of Friendly Force Influence; and
a wide variety of operations conducted