Page 56 - MERCIAN Eagle 2011

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LCpl Armstrong and Pte Robertson conducting rehearsals Cooking in OP Bahadur
were misguided; local combatants were made to fight, paid to fight, or just wanted to fight, or who we created for the fight through cultural slight or tactical error. Separating these men from the criminal elite and out of area fundamentalists was our real influence goal. Easier said than done.
fight; this made friendly force identification interesting, but the synergies were obvious. On the opposite arc, the ANA Tolay that we partnered understood the principles
of patrolling and provided effective mutual support and depth. There were frustrations but, for the most part, they were good enough.
Tactics used were restricted only by common sense and our imagination.
Trying not to set unnecessary patterns, the following were conducted by the Company:
Bahadur, in particular, fought off some very strong insurgent attacks with the help of Company, Battle Group and Task Force Assets. We have a lot to thank the Army Air Corps, the Royal and US Air Forces, and the Royal Artillery for; their support of our men and the incredible efforts of Sgts Williams’ and Webster’s Fire Support and Mortar Sections saved many lives.
It is enough to say that operations
in Afghanistan were varied, rewarding, complex, dangerous, exciting, isolated, austere, and relevant. C Company was rewarded for its efforts along the way,
but lost friends in the process, making it hard to enjoy what has been an incredibly demanding time for us. Our final thanks must, therefore, go to all of the people back home whose incredible support helped us through our fight. Without them, we would have been in a much worse place.
Our ‘Vital Ground’ throughout the tour was the ability to manoeuvre despite also having to protect so many fixed locations. Manoeuvre, and inherently influence, were made possible through reinforcement
by various assets –
Joint Fires Group,
a Danish Defence
Platoon, Warthog
Group, the Formation
Reconnaissance
Squadron, the Brigade
Reconnaissance Force,
3 Kandak (with OC
D Company, Major Harris) and its Heavy Weapons Tolay - for which we were truly grateful.
Manoeuvre / Force Multipliers ranged from the sublime to the ridiculous. C Company recruited and partnered a 30 man Afghan Local Police Force. Our attached engineers also built this motley crew a Check Point by the mid-point of the tour. They were ‘Afghan Good Enough’, owned by the Village Shura, and able to express the will of that Shura in a way that we could not. Local national support peaked in the ‘West End’, where an individual akin to
the legendary Chuck Norris reacted to all contacts around OP Bahadur by jumping onto its Hesco wall to join sentries in the fire
Chai Bys, Advance
to Shuras, Standing Patrols, Clearances, Observation and Recce Patrols, Obstacle Crossings and Breaching Operations (use of our Infantry Assault Bridge was
a favourite), Screens, Guards, Cordons, Searches and Rummages, Vehicle Check Points, Link Up Operations, Compound Occupations and Short Term Defence, Deception, Ground Domination (spray
paint, stencilling and night letter patrols), Stay-behind Ambushes, Radio Broadcasts, Aviation Patrols, Counter-recce and sniping, CIMIC and more... the list is almost endless, and that was all within the first two months! It was all about the people, but when the insurgent engaged, we tried to play him at his own game, drilling murder holes and bringing him on to pre-prepared positions that we had occupied at night, undermining him and his narrative whenever the opportunity arose. OPs Bahar and
Tactics used were restricted only by common sense and our imagination
THE MERCIAN EAGLE
Pte Pender killing time in OP Bahadur