Page 58 - The Cormorant Issue 14

The State of Strategy
By Dr Patrick Porter, University of Reading
On the day of writing, a glance at the news suggests there should be every reason for a renaissance in British strategic studies.
A fiscal crisis threatens to engulf the economies of Europe. American hegemony is increasingly under challenge with record deficits and debt as a more multi-polar world looms. Rising Asian giants invest in blue-water navies and rattle sabres over con- tested maritime territories. Saudi Arabia and Iran, the geopolitical heavyweights of the Gulf, confront one another in an intensifying struggle for influence that has been spiked by a popular revolu- tionary upsurge and a fear of foreign-backed subversion in their frontier states. Alongside the hopeful worldwide talk of human rights and democracy, the classical language of ‘Realpolitik’ returns, of rival blocs, client states, cold war and even a nuclear arms race. As before, the fatal interaction of revolution, reaction and ambition could light the torch of a regional war, or worse.
In the UK, the government struggles to reconcile its refusal to entertain ‘strategic shrinkage’ with depleted economic and mili- tary power. A convergence of dwindling resources, defence infla- tion and popular demand for other services combine to make our high-tech forces increasingly unaffordable. For the fourth time in a decade, we are at war with a sovereign state. Attempting to wage a liberal intervention on the cheap with stand-off weapons, a limited effort at enforcing a no-fly zone becomes an expanding commitment. We now have a war of regime change with British military advisors on the ground and a weighty responsibility of no certain duration or ending. As our power contracts, our commit- ments widen. The dialectic of ends, ways and means is ruptured.
Are we, then, on the cusp of a renaissance in strategic thinking in this country?
We can only hope. Alas, the evidence points the other way. The study of strategy – the role of war in world politics, the prudent pursuit of security and the national interest, and the endless effort to align power and interests - remains marginal in our uni- versities. It occupies a modest share of our own curriculum here at Staff College. It is not a driving force of our national politics and little separates our politicians over British grand strategy. During the recent strategic review, fundamental aspects of British power and identity were effectively taken off the table of debate: the nuclear deterrent, the Anglo-American relationship, the need for an expansive ‘global role.’ These questions are not presented for open discussion even within our American-inspired architecture of a National Security Council. We hardly study strategy and we hardly argue about it.
Strategy is at heart the study of power politics, and ‘strategic studies’ privileges the state as a central player. It is not exclu- sive to political realism, the pessimistic tradition that accepts insecurity, anarchy and power politics as facts of life. But it is most strongly associated with it. Yet as the American colossus
John Mearsheimer observed on one visit to this country, politics and IR departments are mostly dominated by idealists in many forms who have largely purged political realists from their ranks. The British academy is full of sophisticated people. But it lacks a healthy balance of opinion, which is ironic for an academy that prides itself on the ideal of ‘diversity.’ A prudent vision of inter- national politics must somehow marry morality and power, uto- pianism with calculations of real strength. And war is the ultimate political and moral subject. Without strategy, without the effort to align our power with our commitments and values, it is killing without purpose.
In the interwar period of the twentieth century, historian E.H. Carr denounced the intellectuals of his time for their neglect of power and their unbalanced embrace of utopian idealism. He might have been speaking of us, in the twenty-first century, where slo- gans that recognise few limitations (‘punching above our weight’, ‘global player’, ‘force for good’) and the dubious mantras of globalisation theory have replaced deep strategic reckoning to the point where it is very difficult to define the national interest, let alone consider how to pursue it. And this precisely at the moment when it is needed. The equilibrium of the Pax Americana threatens to unravel in the Gulf and in East Asia, the very future and character of its model of democratic capitalism itself is being recast, and European states must confront a long postponed question: what to do now that the US is drawing down and shift- ing its geopolitics from West to East. Grand and meaty questions are on the table. Are we prepared to grapple with them?
If this article has any audience, it is a class of military profession- als amongst whom our future senior officers and service chiefs will come from. You are not, or should not be, sidelined from the debate we need to have. You will advise governments on the design and purpose of our armed forces. And you should be consulted on what constitutes our national interest. Civil mili- tary relations should not be conducted as a matter of civilians pronouncing on policy and the military receiving and execut- ing it. It is supposed to be a dialogue – albeit an unequal dia- logue – where you educate policymakers and wider society on the nature and limits of organised violence and its place in the nation’s statecraft. It is a political debate, and as well as being ultimately obedient to civilian authority, the military cannot and should not be apolitical. Strategy should happen in your minds, not just ‘somewhere else.’
On a more personal note, this is my final year at Staff College and at King’s. As Churchill said of cigars and booze, I can report that I have got more out of teaching military officers, and reaped more rewards from them, than they have gotten out of me. They will no doubt agree. So long. And good luck.
Dr Patrick Porter is a Reader in Strategic Studies at the Univer- sity of Reading and a Fellow of CDS’ Strategic Forum.
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