Page 60 - The Cormorant Issue 14

was. Despite flying all the way from the UK and the requirement for several air to air refuellings, the pilot abandoned the mission when it became obvious that there were civilians at risk near the target area. This was a brilliant military operation and was deftly handled to reassure rebels, friends and allies about our intentions, prob- ably achieving far more than the original kinetic action could ever have hoped. This also helped demonstrate that the right intention (humanitarian protection rather than say oil contracts or opinion poll ratings) was not only the primary motivating factor but also that it was shaping the way the mission was being carried out.
That brings us to reasonable chance of success – a pragmatic concern, but an important one nevertheless for it requires that we define success before embarking on military endeavours. The debates leading up to the adoption of UNSCR 1973 were exten- sive. Commentators lined up on both sides to argue about the fea- sibility and practicality as well as the ethics of imposing such a pol- icy of protecting civilians in a sovereign state. Would a no-fly zone work? Can you protect people from the air without ‘boots on the ground’? Would there inevitably be mission creep? Once the reso- lution was adopted, French, British and US forces went into action very quickly, destroying many of the Libyan units threatening Beng- hazi and probably averting serious mass civilian casualties there as a result. The scope then broadened to eliminate Libyan airpower and associated C2 centres, then further still to encompass tanks and artillery as well as even maritime munitions dumps, leading to questions about the true end state being sought. Under the air cover provided by their new allies, the badly organised rebels made some significant progress before their advance slowed and they themselves started to suffer significant reversals. Now some say
that arming the rebels, with or without the authority provided by the UNSCR is necessary for success. Moral certainties do not remain static in conflict– today’s victim can very easily become tomorrow’s perpetrator of harm against those we initially sought to protect. For example, the fledgling state of Kosovo still has to come to terms with the (still denied) ‘counter’ ethnic cleansing that took place against the Serb minority following the 1999 intervention, under the umbrella of NATO protection. When considering the thorny ques- tion of arming the Libyan rebels, this is a real worry. What would this mean for the people of Tripoli? Do we just give the rebels enough to make sure things are even on the ground? Or, as France and Britain now appear to be arguing, does successfully protecting the civilian population require regime change? If not, how long are we prepared to wait for the civilian population to become safe?
The Just War Tradition is more than simply a checklist. It is a series of interlinked questions, some very prudential, some more fundamental, but all-important to some extent when trying to determine if a military involvement is the right course of action. However, it can only provide a framework for analysis and a lan- guage for aiding discussion, not the actual political and practical military answers themselves. What is clear is that situations can change. What might start off as one thing can quickly change into something else and keeping a clear focus on what we are trying to do, what motivated us in the first place and therefore why we are doing it is essential if we are to avoid mission creep and ultimately, risk mission failure.
Dr David Whetham is a Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London.
ACSC 14, the ‘Arab Spring’ and the Libyan Conflict
Dr Andrew M Dorman
When the ACSC was first envisaged, it was not thought that conflicts involving British forces would break out with any degree of regularity. The Cold War was at an end, the situation in North- ern Ireland was much improved, and Bosnia had become a nation-building exercise.
However, for ACSC 14, like too many of its predecessors, this has not been the case. With the exception of ACSC 1, the first six years witnessed a new operation or conflict involving British forces break- ing out each year (ACSC 2 – Operation Desert Fox and Kosovo; ACSC 3 – Sierra Leone; ACSC 4 – Operation Barras; ACSC 5 – Afghanistan; ACSC 6 – Iraq). There was then a relative lull as British forces supported the Americans and others in post-conventional phase of Operation Telic in Iraq. However, ACSC 9 witnessed the deployment of the 3 PARA battle-group to Southern Afghanistan and the armed forces began to ‘run hot’ from then onwards.
Yet few of these conflicts have been part of so potentially a pro- found movement as the Libyan conflict and the ‘Arab Spring’. Probably only the 9/11 attacks on America have had the poten- tial for a similar level of consequences within the international system. As the end of June approaches the Libyan conflict has passed the 90-day point and senior naval and air force officers have warned of the dangers of this conflict going on beyond the 20 September and becoming an enduring operation from a Brit- ish viewpoint. As with Kosovo, the international community has largely sought to achieve success through the use of air power
and support to local forces (in Kosovo it was the KLA); whether this will work remains to be seen. The final factors that influenced Milosevic over Kosovo appear to have been a mixture of diplo- matic efforts (bringing the Russians on board), an air campaign that switched its targeting to the interests of the Milosevic’s prin- ciple supporters and the threat of escalation into a ground war.
For NATO, Libya – like Kosovo – has highlighted divisions within the alliance, with the Italians currently calling for a ceasefire and the Germans refusing to participate. It has also shown that the capability differential that was so stark in Kosovo remains, which is worrying, especially given the US Defense Secretary Gates’ recent comment about a possible future NATO without the United States.
The wider ‘Arab Spring’ is far more significant and a number of commentators have already compared it to 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe. Like 1989, predicting the course of events is proving difficult and probably the only thing that can be safely said about the Arab Spring and the Libyan crisis is that neither is at an end. What it has shown is that liberal interventionism is far from dead, and that prime ministers and presidents are fre- quently forced into commitments that they might otherwise have wished to avoid.
For the students of ACSC 14, the fact that British Forces found themselves in a conflict as part of a NATO-led coalition, support-
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