Page 89 - The Wish Stream Year of 2020 Crest

Lords in July, only to be halted, mainly because the Lords felt unwilling to agree to it without a second Bill laying down exactly how non-pur- chase purchase and promotions would work after abolition. As a result, the queen, on the advice of her ministers, abolished purchase by royal warrant (a royal prerogative) on 20 July 1871. Although this step was widely condemned by both government and opposition parties alike, Gladstone robustly sought to justify it since the Commons had sanctioned it (this was before the Parliament Act of 1911 limiting the power of the House of Lords to overrule the Commons). The Lords, although deciding not to pursue the matter, nevertheless proposed a
‘The just claims of all officers affected by the abolition of purchase in the army have been equitably and even liberally dealt with, and where in a few isolated cases grievances remain unremedied, those grievances existed during the purchase system itself, and did not arise in any respect from its abolition.’
Effects of purchase on the
Army and society
One of the main purposes of the purchase system, thereby recruiting officers from such a restricted social class, was to ensure a com- monality between civilian, political and military
motion of censure to the effect that the government action in obtaining royal prerogative was: ‘calculated to depreciate and neutralise the independent action of the legislature and is strongly to be condemned’.
Implementation
The queen, on
the advice of her ministers, abolished purchase by royal warrant (a royal prerogative) on 20 July 1871
institutions where the leaders were recruited broadly from the same social class, the monied landed gentry. It was felt that military offic- ers would have the same social connections and background as the others and therefore a strong commitment to the existing order. For that reason, and also as the officers did not normally depend on the Army for their livelihood, it was felt that they would be less
In November 1871, there were
6,938 officers with vested rights
to compensation, so far as purchase was con- cerned. After some discussion, it was eventually agreed that both regulation price and over-reg- ulation price (where paid) should be compen- sated. The Army Purchase Commission was established to determine the amount payable to each officer. The Commissioners comprised two senior Army officers well acquainted with the purchase system and the Deputy Judge Advo- cate. For each officer to be compensated, both the regulation price of their rank had to be deter- mined, as well as the estimated over-regulation price. The first was easy; the latter much more complex to determine and the Commission set- tled on the customary price prevalent in different regiments on 1 January 1871. There were cer- tainly some grievances aired by individual offic- ers (presumably those officers who had paid well over the odds for their promotions), but the gov- ernment felt that overall the vast majority of offic- ers had benefitted. But as to be expected from unravelling a complex system, there continued to be pockets of dissatisfaction that continued until the Commission’s final report in June 1874, and even beyond when the cases of individual disgruntled officers were taken up by MPs in the Commons. However, by the time the Commis- sion was wound up as late as 1909, the Com- mission’s final chairman, General Sir Robert Bid- dulph, reported that:
likely to support social disorder or revolt. That certainly proved to be the case in Britain, but not so in France where many officers, who had pur- chased their commissions, in both the army and navy supported the revolution of 1789, although the social, economic and political circumstances at the time were markedly different to those in Britain.
Purchase was also believed to assist with rapid promotion and early retirement of the many offic- ers from wealthy and aristocratic backgrounds who did not intend to stay too long in the Army. Perhaps only long enough to enjoy the social activities which were an integral part of army life. This was thought to help prevent the establish- ment of a professional officer corps isolated from society. The payments for commissions and pro- motion also helped to influence the behaviour of officers, especially if they had made significant over-regulation payments. Unless they were very wealthy, they would not want to risk forfeiting their payments for poor conduct, or indeed by supporting a revolution to overthrow the existing order.
On the other hand, favourable financial circum- stances of officers gave them independence should parliament order the Army to be used for a purpose an individual officer objected to.
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