Page 36 - ABA Salvoes 1999-2024

at 1407hrs and we opened fire at 1413hrs. The sequence of NGS events thereafter was: 1411-1421hrs – first fire mission, tgt Tussock Flats landing area; after two small spotting corrections fired 20 rounds HE FFE. 1424- 1441hrs – spreading fire at add 400 at Brown Mountain; fired 40 rounds HE FFE. 1445hrs – H Hour. 1510-1535hrs – second fire mission, tgt Horse Head area; after five small corrections pinpointed tgt, 40 rounds HE FFE. 1540- 1555hrs – third fire mission, first round on tgt, 12 rounds HE FFE. Tgt believed to be enemy gun site. 1613-1705hrs – final fire mission along coast to Grytviken in advance of our troops; after one correction fired 20 rounds HE FFE. 1705hrs – white flag seen above buildings at King Edward Point.7 At 1705hrs HMS ANTRIM closed Grytviken for direct fire, but with the surrender it was not required. Similarly HMS PLYMOUTH was later prepared for direct fire at Leith, but none was needed. The effects of NGS had been decisive, and I was particularly pleased to hear the spotter’s report that he had never seen more effective fire than that of HMS PLYMOUTH. A few technical points, made in an annex to Capt Pentreath’s report, follow. They will be of particular interest to NGLOs past and present. Careful grid overlays were drawn up to reflect the Army ‘series one’ grid system. This preparation was hastily updated 30 hours before the firing when Army ‘series two’ gridded maps were received. A series of briefings was given by Lt Col Eve to discuss general points, such as crest clearance problems and tgt selection/numbering. It was decided that the most accurate means of navigation would entail tuning the Action JYA Table with 1006 radar medium pulse of 16 miles with grid overlay. It was possible from this position to concentrate the NGS team into a small compact area, allowing the BCO full communications with the Gunnery system, and the other parts of the operations room to function normally. Internal communications arrangements allowed key personnel access to the spotting net, and an ‘open line’ linked the Command with proceedings. System preparations included two full sets of SOCs daily and four-hourly ballistic calculations.
Ammunition assigned for NGS was HE fuzed N97 fuzed ‘low sensitivity’. HE fuzed N3 (DA) was substituted later in the firings when it became clear that expenditure would be high. The fall of shot was just as effective and the HEVT was retained in the gunbay in preparation for any SU/AA engagements. Initial communications circuit difficulties were quickly overcome. The services of our NGLO, Sgt Major Richard,s were invaluable in setting up comms with our spotter. The gun tgt line was fouled during two missions by helicopters lifting troops ashore. A simple dog leg flight path is essential if firings are not to be interrupted. When turning over a section of the Ops Room for NGS, full facilities for conducting other forms of action should be retained. As expected, when confronted with the ‘real thing’ the team excelled, especially the turrets/gunbay crews who sustained a rate of 16 RPGPM during the operation.
Air Defence by day, NGS by night – the last few days of May. In the last few action-packed days, my young ship’s company had grown up considerably. They had come under attack from the air, had seen two fine ships bombed and sunk, and had witnessed burial of the dead at sea. Their nerves were taut and the maintenance of morale was high on my list of priorities. Fortunately, the continued daily very high rate of attrition of the Argentine Air Force by CAP, land- and ship-based missiles and close range weapon, provided the necessary stimulus and, although we were all pensive at the beginning of each day, wondering what fate might befall us, as the hours went by people ‘perked up’ splendidly. However the news, flashed to the Fleet on the evening of 25 May, of the loss of HMS COVENTRY and MV ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, was a serious blow. However, the Argentines suffered heavy losses in earlier raids, 3 out of 4 A4s were splashed during a lunchtime raid on theAOA,onebyHMSYarmouth’s20mmfromwhichthe pilot ejected and was duly recovered for debrief. It was also believed that 7 aircraft out of the 12 attacking HM Ships COVENTRY and BROADSWORD were subsequently
HMS Plymouth hosting the Argentine surrender, 14 June 1982
34 | Amphibious Bombardment Association