Page 37 - ABA Salvoes 1999-2024

splashed. A bomb actually hit HMS BROADSWORD but it passed cleanly through the Flight Deck and out of the ship’s side without exploding!
NGS By Night. To round off this action-packed 25 May, HMS PLYMOUTH embarked an SBS/SAS spotter team to conduct overnight NGS at Fox Bay, at the other end of Falkland Sound. In order to give maximum time on task, it was necessary to run a high speed passage to the target area and back. After negotiating the straits at 24 knots, the SBS went ashore at 0030hrs on 26 May in the ship’s Avon Searider, with the aim of setting up an OP overlooking numerous enemy positions around Fox Bay. I was relieved when the spotter eventually came up on the net at 0300hrs and the shoot got under way. Communications then faded, and we were all aware of the passage of time! Then at 0500hrs after an anxious 90 minute silence, I heard that the team had re-embarked in their now propellorless Searider and were trying to sail/paddle their boat to the RV. To provide cover for the SBS, the NGS continued apace with the spotter providing his corrections from the drifting Searider! To my, and their, relief, my own Gemini eventually retrieved them safely at 0700hrs under the noses of the enemy, with HMS PLYMOUTH far too close for comfort and under surveillance from shore-based radar, which now and again locked on suspiciously! One or two lessons were learned (spare propellor in the boat, waterproof the radios), but the spotter seemed pleased with the accuracy of our fire. I was glad to return to the relative safety of San Carlos
FALKLANDS 1982: OPERATION SUTTON
by Lieutenant Colonel K R H Eve RA
With the re-taking of South Georgia successfully accomplished, and now a programme of harassment completed, the time had come to prepare for the last phase of Op Corporate, which was the landing and recapture the Falkland Islands – Op SUTTON.
The retaking of South Georgia was rather too easy to give us much useful practice, but it did give us a chance to polish our drills and prove the ‘systems’. We knew the types of ships of old (which indeed they were) – the DLGs and Type 12s and they had fired very well, but now we were keen to try out the 42s and 22s. We didn’t have long to wait. Op TORNADO was an excellent opportunity to prove all types of gun-ships, to modify our drills and to cement relationships between the Battery personnel, the ships’ companies and Special Forces. It was to be a very busy period when spotters and LOs were stretched to the limit. It also underlined several marked shifts in attitude. All the ships were firing well within Fleet Standards, so spotters were bringing initial salvoes closer to our own forces with confidence, added to which there were very few loose rounds. There was a puzzling incidence of grid reference anomalies at the south end of the Falkland Sound, i.e. in the area of Fox Bay Settlement, and we
where, for the first day since D Day, no enemy aircraft entered the harbour. HMS PLYMOUTH remained in ‘bomb alley’ during daylight hours for a further four days, while at night undertaking escort duties for a variety of movements in/out of amphibious and STUFT shipping. Air raid warnings RED became less frequent, although during the evening of 27 May in two consecutive A4 attacks, shore tgts were hit for the first time. Rapier scored more hits, as did HMS FEARLESS’s 40mm, and the average 50% attrition rate of attacking aircraft was maintained. Good. The military situation ashore was being closely monitored through the good offices of our NGLO, Sgt Maj Richards (who had been with us at South Georgia), who kept his ear close to the ground, as well as the BBC Overseas which gave us frequent sitreps on the movements of 2 PARA towards Darwin/Goose Green. Indeed the enemy seems to have taken advantage of this intelligence to reinforce his troops so that the assault, when it went in, was tough in the extreme, and cost the lives of the CO and 19 of his men. However, victory was assured with the astonishing news of 150 Argentinian dead along with no fewer than 1200 POWs.
Conclusion. Royal Naval NGS played a vital part in winning the Falklands War and there can be no doubt that this capability will continue to be required in the foreseeable future. The Amphibious Bombardment Association will continue to flourish and help to maintain our well proven expertise in the art of NGS.
concluded that getting close to changes in grid origin, the maps and charts were up to 400 yards out of kilter. Allowances had to be made on the estimated differences. Another attitude shift was the ‘adoption’ of spotting teams by the SAS and SBS. Whereas when we started TORNADO they were indifferent as to whether they had spotters with them or not, now they wanted their ‘own’! This could have its drawbacks as the patrols disappeared into the Falklands mists in strict radio silence, which made it impossible for me to brief them for their next tasks which were often getting under way. The situation improved a bit when two more spotting teams (Kevin Arnold’s FO 4 & Nigel Bedford’s FO 3) and two more LOs, Capt Bob Harmes and BSM Malcolm joined us towards the end of TORNADO. Since the beginning of operations I had agreed with the Fleet Gunnery Officer on the format of a (Post) Bombardment Report. These were originated by the LO in the bombarding ship and consisted of the target numbers, details, grid, number of salvoes and qualifying remarks on the results of the shoot, (sometimes laying the foundations for hot discussion!). They were widely distributed within the fleet and proved useful in many ways.
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