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NGLO REPORT - AL FAW PENINSULA, OP TELIC, 21-23 MAR 03
By Major Peter Boyce RA(V), NGLO
The initial plan for the use of NGS (now Naval Fire Support, NFS) in the Second Gulf War was simple. Up to four ships were to bombard one Iraqi target area prior to H-Hour. To support this plan, one NGLO – myself – was mobilised on the 30th January and was in Kuwait by the 2nd February to be briefed by CO 29 Cdo Regt. After an uncomfortable, but fortunately short, period ashore, I spent six weeks or so moving between the likely gunships, briefing on the changing plans and assisting with work-up training. Although two Type 42 destroyers were, at various stages, on the list of potential gunships, the final “selection” was one Type 22 frigate, HMS CHATHAM, two Type 23 frigates, HMS MARLBOROUGH and HMS RICHMOND, and one Australian frigate, a MEKO 200 (a German design built in Australia), HMAS ANZAC. HMS CHATHAM and HMS RICHMOND are fitted with the Mark 8 4.5inch gun, HMS MARLBOROUGH with the Mark 8 4.5inch Mod 1 gun and HMAS ANZAC with the US 5inch gun.
The final plan for the employment of NFS was for the four ships to provide fire onto the AL FAW Peninsula in support of 40 Cdo during the daylight hours of the first full day of the operation. Two spotter teams from 148 Bty were to direct the fire. It was expected that fire would initially be onto the Iraqi “Military Installation” near the tip of the peninsula, and then be in direct support of 40 Cdo’s clearance of a date plantation area on the eastern side of the peninsula below AL FAW town. The mobilisation of additional NGLOs was considered and, at the stage when it seemed likely that two ships would be providing directed fire for 24 hours, a second NGLO was tasked. Unfortunately it was decided that the mobilisation process wouldn’t allow him to get to theatre in time and it was cancelled, much to Mick O’Connor’s frustration! With only one NGLO, I proposed that I should be on board HMAS ANZAC for the Operation. The reasons were compelling, as that ship had the biggest gun, the most ammunition, the longest range and the shallowest draught – certainly the most flexible in the circumstances. In addition, as RAN, she was not part of NATO and so there were some procedural issues I could potentially help with.
The build-up and preparation included filling magazines and gunbays – an action that brought home to the ships’ crews that this was the real thing! Part of the build up was also flying members of the 148 Bty teams on board to run practice sessions with the ships who were to support them. The Fire Support Areas (FSAs) were finally selected and named by the lead NGS ship, HMS MARLBOROUGH, as GOLD, JUNO and SWORD! GOLD was not to be used unless 42 Cdo needed additional fire support, and only the ships could provide it by occupying GOLD. HMS MARLBOROUGH and HMAS ANZAC were to deploy to JUNO, with HMS CHATHAM and HMS RICHMOND to
SWORD. The water was shallow in the FSAs and even more shallow in the approaches, so the move forward into the FSAs on the night of the 20th March had the ships’ navigators playing the lead roles. Once in place, the ships effectively “stemmed the tide” and spent the period of engagement stationary – NGS “frozen”. Once in the FSAs, the reports came through of the successful securing of the initial objectives (oil installations) and the ships sent their GURF reports (Guns Up Ready to Fire) at 0136Z.
At dawn, the specialist US air support departed and the ships were ready to fire. Much of 40 Cdo was now only supported by “on request” air support, the guns of 8 Cdo Bty, which had been flown over to the AL FAW, and the four ships. All the ships engaged the Military Installation in turn, with HMAS ANZAC firing first at 0304Z. Fire was very accurate and effective. White flags were soon appearing, although this wasn’t the end of resistance from this big (over 1sq km) target area. The support then switched to the first phase of the clearance of the date plantation, the first objective being a command post manned by regular Naval Infantry. This was secured by last light on the 21st. The request was then made – and immediately accepted – for the ships to remain on station for a further 24 hours. At first light on the 22nd, the advance continued and the ships were used to engage targets as D Coy 40 Cdo moved from AL FAW town to the tip of the peninsula. Because of the location of the FSAs – JUNO’s position meant that fire from there was at right angles to the line of advance – HMS MARLBOROUGH and HMAS ANZAC were the ships most used.
The advance continued until it reached the Military Installation, and the last missions were fired on this again. By last light the peninsula had been successfully cleared, with one broken leg as the only casualty for 40 Cdo. One ship was requested to stay on station overnight, which HMAS ANZAC was happy to do and she left the FSA at first light on the 23rd. Overall, the NGS was very effective: fire was accurate, responsive, safe and reliable. From the original, simple plan, it became directed support during the daylight hours of two days, but with ships on station and available throughout 54 hours. During this period, the availability of the ships increased in importance as other assets were moved away. Seventeen missions were fired in total. One SITREP reported “success is due to aggressive use of indirect fire support, especially the swift response from NGS ships, which had a huge impact on the ground and shattered the enemy’s will to fight.” As for the NGLO – after moving off the gun line, I made my way back to HMS ARK ROYAL. Having established that there was no further task for me, I flew back to UK on the 2nd April. For me it was, professionally, a very satisfying experience.
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