Page 70 - Cormorant Issue 20 2017

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The US Election of Donald Trump Professor Greg Kennedy, DSD
WRITING NOW AT THE beginning of June 2017, some fair amount of time has passed since the election of Donald Trump to the of ce
of President of the United States took place. With a bit of distance now, away from the heat of campaigning and the sting of electoral
defeat, with some modest evidence to use in the assessment of what it all means, what has the election of Donald Trump to the world’s most powerful democratic of ce produced?
Firstly, those who feared a raw, unbridled capitalist approach to politics still rightfully possess those reservations. His zero-sum approach to international relations, his idea that politics and power are
the equivalent of business decisions and money, provide dangerous and naïve ssures in American foreign and defence policies that opponents are exploiting with abandon. Russian leaks, gestures
of cooperation, or even just the recognition of the American President being “unjustly persecuted” in his own country, have manipulated the ego-centric Trump around the world’s stage like a Punch and Judy puppet. At the same time these accusations have made sure his administration is mired in a morass of investigation and mudslinging that allows little serious time for leadership and contemplation to take place. His inconsistencies in language,
in actions, to say nothing of inability to keep key administrative posts linked to national security and foreign policy in place for any signi cant period
of time, have destabilized America’s engagement with NATO, the Syrian Crisis and wider Asia-Paci c
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security dynamic. The unapologetic crudity of the man, and his administration’s demeanour, lend a an unclean and tainted odour to any event or policy statement. For a nation that has founded its foreign and national security policies upon the rhetoric of moral purity and superiority, these perceptions and images are a toxic mix.
Trump’s presentation, actions and statements,
only add fuel to an already hotly burning global anti-Americanism that rebels against a capitalist, moralizing, rapacious and imperialist America. An isolated, domineering, America- rst America is not a global leader: it is a global problem. No amount
of military power, the principle weapon it seems Trump wishes to fall back on as his international relations stick, can rectify such strategic narratives. Given the inability of the Trump administration to seize any deep or broad international recognition
as being competent, or even exercise the domestic leadership to be able to ll key administration posts for any length of time and generate new legislation and not just destroy old, there seems a lot of work to do already in the remaining three and a half years to reconstitute America’s international reputation for leadership.
Having limited powers, such as Israel, embrace both Trump and his Middle East agenda will do little to mitigate against the growth of anti-Americanism in that region. An insecure and reactive Israeli regional lead will happily exploit an unwary and desperate American President whose whole approach to dif cult problems appears to be to get a deal done on the basis of personal relationships. Such simplistic and emotional inclinations will not lead to an effective American engagement with the Middle East, but
instead, simply to a series of further unhelpful reactions, probably of a military kind. However, one does then have to ask, how much does the President and his administration really wish to engage with
the international arena? From rst impressions, the answer would seem to be very little.
Pointing out to NATO nations, while in Brussels, the duplicity and free-riding of their defence spending and support to the Alliance is not a wrong-headed policy. That is indeed a welcome cold shower of reality to the paci st European elements who no longer believe in the legitimacy of military power in international affairs. Nor is the desire to draw North Korea’s attention to the fact that any escalation in its use of military power to destabilize the region will provoke an American response necessarily
a bad thing. Indeed, one could argue, if rose- coloured glasses were applied, that the Trump presidency has already made closer relations with China a corner-stone of moving forward to contain Korean “irrationality”. However, this analysis asks
the reader to believe there is conscious, deliberate and applied strategic thought being demonstrated by the President and his administration. That is an extraordinary request for the suspension of disbelief, the rst principle required for any acceptance of ction as a plausible reality. In the rst place, neither Donald Trump nor any of his closest advisors are Henry Kissinger. Secondly, most of that suspension can no longer be expected after June 1st and President Trump’s announcement that he was pulling the United States out of the Paris Climate Accords.
Wrapping his decision in the rhetoric of “saving America” from a world out to pull the United States down onto its knees, Trump demonstrated his
...around the
world’s stage like a Punch and
Judy puppet.
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