Page 78 - The Wish Stream Year of 2021 (Crest)

ogy. While the exact number of China’s agree- ments and investments is unknown, the Merca- tor Institute for China Studies (Merics) estimated that in 2020, China provided more financing for information and communications technology in Africa than all multilateral agencies and leading democracies combined. Digital connectivity and development is crucial for economic growth and China is willingly filling an unmet gap.
Thirty-one Commonwealth countries are small states, many of them island nations with high physical and digital infrastructure develop- ment needs. Many are developing nations which have become deeply embedded in the BRI. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2016, is a good example of how China views cooperation
cated across the Pacific Islands states – many of whom are also Commonwealth members and according to a 2019 Lowy Institute report, are especially vulnerable to unmanageable debt risk.
China’s interests are no
longer limited to trade
Political ties are leading to deeper military pen- etration. Chinese authorities offer military train- ing to states in Africa, the Pacific Islands and the Caribbean. In December 2021 the Japan Times reported that China had earmarked 5,000 places for training Commonwealth military personnel at Chinese command and staff colleges. Mili- tary schools supported by Chinese funds have opened in Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, and China also funded Namibia’s Command
in security and economic realms as symbiotic: creating a level of internal stability in Pakistan would stabilise China’s western periph- ery, notably Xinjiang Province. The geographic location of the port at Gwadar as the gateway between western China and the Indian Ocean is thus strategically and economically important. Opera- tional control of Gwadar falls to the China Overseas Port Holding Company.
China is
embracing training opportunities for foreign military elites as part of an integrated economic and military engagement strategy
and Staff College. Officers from small island states, including Barbados, have received training at Chinese academies. China’s People’s Libera- tion Army (PLA) made a USD3million donation to the Barbadian armed forces in 2018 to boost its disaster preparedness and response capabil- ities – the same year that Barbados signed the BRI MOU. In April 2021, the Fiji Times reported that two of its highest-ranking officers, including the Acting Land Force Commander, had obtained masters in military sci-
Other Commonwealth countries have signed cooperation agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) under the BRI. MOU are bilateral government-level agreements that promise cooperation. The detail differs but the basic structure is broadly similar, with both sides reaching an understanding on cooperation based on the BRI’s five cooperation priorities including policy coordination, facilities connectiv- ity and financial integration. MOU are not legally binding per se but China views statements made in the MOU as the seeds for future diplomatic talks. Hence the purpose is to initially exert influ- ence rather than to dictate.
Barbados, the world’s newest republic, which removed the Queen as head of state in Novem- ber 2021 is a case in point. It has taken sub- stantial Chinese loans (USD115 million), has accepted major Chinese infrastructure devel- opment and signed a BRI MOU in 2019. In the Caribbean alone, Grenada, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Antigua and Barbuda signed MOUs in 2018. A similar pattern is being repli-
ence degrees from a Chinese military institution. China is embracing training opportunities for for- eign military elites as part of an integrated eco- nomic and military engagement strategy.
More problematic is the ideological educa- tion components contained within Chinese-run programmes. According to a November 2021 Civitas discussion paper, ideological education promotes China’s “Party-Army model”, which subordinates the army to a ruling party and rein- forces existing elite networks and hierarchies. This development should raise concerns. Since many Commonwealth states are weak or partial democracies, China’s use of military training as a means to promote authoritarian governance models is alarming.
The UK and Commonwealth:
What would China do?
Chris Devonshire-Ellis recently suggested that since the Commonwealth shares similarities with the BRI in terms of size and prominence, it is appropriate to ask how China would oversee the Commonwealth. It should be emphasised here
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