Page 80 - The Wish Stream Year of 2021 (Crest)

and Singapore). Joining the CPTPP will boost the scope of the UK’s access into digital and financial services sectors and enable the UK to potentially establish deeper political influence in the region. CPTPP accession proceedings have undoubtedly been made easier as a result of Commonwealth connections.
Security
The Commonwealth is not a traditional secu- rity/defence compact. Instead, the UK sustains several long-established bilateral cooperation arrangements covering defence
2021, Defence Secretary Wallace and his Ken- yan counterpart, Dr Juma, signed a new five- year Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) allowing both militaries to share expertise, expe- rience and techniques. This agreement came six months after a refreshed Security Compact to deepen wider stability and security cooperation, part of the Kenya-UK strategic partnership.
So far, so good. However, as a gateway to the eastern Africa region, Kenya is a major partner of the BRI, with Mombasa Port integral to BRI
policy development, short term training teams, and joint military deployment.
A recurring scenario for many Commonwealth countries, Kenya’s near loss of Mombasa port serves a warning to others.
operations in Africa. Central to the investment was the construction of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway, com- pleted in 2017, and unprofitable. With Kenya’s worsening economic situation in 2021, it emerged that Mombasa Port served as collateral for unpaid debt to China. Chinese port projects also raise concerns over intelligence collection from commercial operations, undersea cables, and nearby military facilities. A recurring scenario for many Com-
The IR prioritised security and intelligence-sharing partnerships
with Australia, Canada and New
Zealand: through the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing mechanism,
and the Five Powers Defence
Arrangement (UK, Australia, New
Zealand, Malaysia and Singa-
pore). The September 2021 AUKUS (Australia- UK-US trilateral security partnership) announce- ment consolidated the government’s resolve to build like-minded coalitions. Yet, in prioritising Australia, problems have appeared elsewhere. Malaysia, reluctant to be drawn into growing regional rivalry, raised deep reservations over AUKUS.
monwealth countries, Kenya’s near loss of Mom- basa port serves a warning to others.
A balanced approach
The benefits of the Commonwealth network to the UK are far-ranging.
Yet, the IR was relatively silent on what, if any, role the UK intends for the Commonwealth. Its cursory nod to the Commonwealth weakly rec- ognised it as “an important institution in sup- porting an open and resilient international order, bringing together states with a national interest in promoting democracy, sustaining individual freedoms, driving sustainable development and enabling cross-border trade in goods and services”.
Should the UK prioritise investing diplomatic, trade and military resources in the Common- wealth and in Commonwealth member states? The answer might start with the question, “What would China do?”
In light of the increasingly complex international security environment, perhaps it is time to estab- lish a Commonwealth Strategic and Economic Dialogue mechanism with a view to building cross-Commonwealth mini-lateral groupings to discuss jointly-held security and BRI concerns.
The long-standing UK-Kenya bilateral defence relationship involves UK forces routinely work with Kenyan counterparts in training, military assistance, stabilisation, anti-poaching and anti- piracy via the British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK). The UK’s presence is effective but small, consisting of 100 permanent staff. In July
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