Page 92 - QDG 2023
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                                90 1st The Queen’s Dragoon Guards
 6th (United Kingdom) Division
    Headquarters 6th (UK) Division has been raised and disbanded on five occasions over an iterative 213-year history. It has been an answer to specific problems: partnering with the Portu- guese in the Peninsular Wars; generating the mass of men and guns required for the Western Front; enabling the Western Desert Force; commanding and staffing the headquarters of Regional Command (South) in Kandahar; and most recently, integrating information manoeuvre and unconventional warfare. Since it created 77th Brigade and the Specialised Infantry Battalions out of the 2015 Defence and Security Review, the Army has been on course to generate Land Special Opera- tion Forces (Land SOF). The closure of HQ 6 Div – where I had the privilege of serving as its last Chief of Staff for just over a year – was part of that evolution.
The term ‘special’ can be a stumbling block to some people’s perceptions perhaps suggesting exclusivity or exqui- siteness. But special operations are not defined by the forces that conduct them but rather by their novel and contentious nature, risk profile and by the levels of assurance required. The benefit of this approach is that any part of the Army can be task organised to support a special operation. And there are good reasons to develop Land SOF: to free up special forces from some existing tasks to focus on the most challenging and discrete activities; to address a paradigm shift to grey zone activities that requires more specialist capabilities; and to be able to offer them to alliances, most importantly NATO.
Land SOF capabilities are multi-do-
main and require integration with capabilities at the level of command most effectively able to synchronise their application. Synchronisation is on the critical path to achieving convergence, defined in JDP
will deliver this within the appropriate operational headquarters’ Joint Effects Cell. Consonant with a drive to reduce the size of headquarters, platforms and
0-20 UK Land Power as ‘the
concerted employment of
effects created in multiple
domains and directed at
decisive points, such as an
adversary’s systems, forma-
tions, commander or ground.’
Whilst this systems approach
may be taken by tactical
formations, especially when
allocated capability and permissions, operational
and component headquar-
ters may be better placed to
integrate Land SOF effects
across the temporal, physical and virtual deep. For this reason, Land SOF is now vested in HQ Field Army working to the Land Component Commander.
Whether in conflict, crisis or competi- tion, three mutually supporting elements – platform, cell, reach back – are required to fight the capability. A platform is a forward partnered and stand-off relation- ship with host nation SOF or directorates that provides access and generates insights. It is designed to be built out to broaden a network, to act as a surrogate to other specialist activity, to conduct intelligence gathering ahead of crisis and to help set a theatre for conflict. Land SOF platforms will share multi-domain intelligence start points, some derived from partners, that could be developed into actionable targets. A deployed cell
cells will reach back to rear based targets and effects cell for support. Target packs, put through the full Defence targeting process, will contribute to military advantage and create choice for policy makers.
Land SOF is a logical evolution of existing units and formations. It is neither a niche nor exquisite capa- bility. Nor is it a sport reserved for an exclusive few. It is a capability that draws on the good work of others to integrate our
information operations brigade, special operations brigade, cyber and electronic warfare units with military intelligence and multi-domain targeting. And whilst the structures that helped raise, develop and command these capabilities have changed and may yet morph further, the capability itself should endure because there is a pressing operational need for it and looming NATO commitments that demand it. If we do this, and well, then Land SOF will integrate special opera- tions in a manner that does not simply free up special forces for other tasks but adds to military advantage by helping to make the deep battle as decisive as possible whether in conflict, crisis or competition.
HTL
The term ‘special’ can be a stumbling block to some people’s perceptions
  A view from Whitehall
    There is a healthy QDG cohort, past and present, in Main Building and across a number of Whitehall departments. World events over the last 12 months have ensured that not only is our Regiment having another busy year but all aspects of Defence remain committed well beyond comfortable levels. A changing Ministerial team, forthcoming elections and a perilous financial position across the public sector will have been constants for the many Whitehall warriors amongst this readership, they remain as present as ever.
At the time of writing a balancing act is being played to ensure that the UK remains in the lead as the partner of choice for Ukraine, regains influence and access in the Middle East and finds ways to continue to service the global ambition set out in recent policy reviews. Initiatives such as training Ukrainian land forces have rightly captured much attention and continue to give significant leverage and access. The Regiment’s contribution to NATO operations in Eastern Europe comes at a critical time as NATO seeks to demonstrate its credibility and capability. Upwards of 80,00 NATO troops will have deployed to Eastern Europe in early
2024 to support this. It is likely to remain a focus for the government and Defence for many years to come.
Events in the Middle East have highlighted the need to reassure regional allies of the UK’s commitment to the region. Once again, the Regiment’s network of experts in the area have been front and centre of our efforts to deploy the right capabilities at the right time without driving a coach and horses through the broader global programme.
Whilst 2022 was dominated by Ukraine, 2023 was best characterised by issues appearing in nearly every continent on a regular basis. African coups, non-combatant evacua- tion operations, humanitarian relief as well as backfilling other public sector workers on industrial action are but some of the areas that have occupied this small outpost on White- hall. There is little sign that political ambition for Defence to remain ready, usable and even more productive will wane, especially in an election year where foreign policy will be expected to just happen whilst domestic issues take centre stage.
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