Page 63 - Mercian Eagle 2014

would act as his control station. From their we could share our surveillance feeds and provide emergency casualty evacuation by helicopter if it was needed, but the operation would otherwise be entirely Afghan lead
artillerymen in the KLT and Capt Priggs trained as a Mortars’ Officer, there was always a lot of interest when the ANA dusted off their 82mm mortars and put down some indirect fire. Their approach was different to our own but fairly effective, orientating the mortars off a map laid
in front of the barrel and then adjusting from a nearby sangar. Fortunately their corrections were very good and they could quickly adjust fall of shot. It led to an interesting question for the KLT; is it better
and coordinated. For the most part this
was all pretty safe as we were within secure compounds and any incoming fire was neutralised by the walls or passed overhead in pleasing trails of red and green tracer. The ANA could easily over match these shoots and there was always a hearty response with all sorts of weaponry
(the heavier the better)
which continued long
after the insurgents
have left. The KLT
seldom intervened as
our rules of engagement
required us to have a
more positive idea of the
enemy location before
engaging.
When we did manage to identify a machine gun team at range which we could strike with indirect fire, the bored Brigade headquarters above us would be quick to take control from us to execute
the strike and in many cases, deliberate until the opportunity was missed. Naturally we still accepted the glory from the ANA when a strike was successful as they were always very well received and helped to maintain the credit in our relationship. Mostly the ANA did not need anything more than passive help from our surveillance or medical evacuation chain.
When it came to a straight fight between the ANA and the insurgents, the ANA would always come out on top. We never felt unsafe out with them. With three
to break standing orders by assisting
with adjustments or
to allow the Afghan Army to shell the wrong area until they got their corrections right? One to contemplate in the NAAFI, I know what I chose to do.
Fortunately their corrections were very good and they could quickly adjust fall of shot.
As the tour
spent more time with
progressed and we
the Afghan Army and did less and less
for them it was clear how little they really needed our help. Yes there were shortfalls
in the technology available to them, but actually they had other ways of doing things that were equally effective. An important part of the process of lifting off was helping them to realise how little they really needed us and therefore empowering them to conduct more of their operations without us. Given the choice the Afghans would always rather we did things for them; after all we were better equipped and our tours were shorter so it makes sense for us to do it on our short time in Helmand. However as we stepped back they stepped forward. And when they did it was always bitter sweet
as for the most part we wanted to deploy alongside them as much as we wanted them to succeed without us. As I write this now the final KLT has lifted off and the ANA are holding Central Helmand without British soldiers alongside them. I have no doubt that they will succeed where they want to but equally will not be surprised to here that they have chosen not to stand and fight over the same ground we had chosen. Their outlook is different to ours and their measures of success are different too but an Afghan solution will endure.
THE MERCIAN EAGLE
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