Page 10 - The Royal Lancers Chapka 2018

8 REGIMENTAL JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL LANCERS (QUEEN ELIZABETHS’ OWN) Developing Divisional Level Ground
Synopsis
Ground Reconnaissance in the Divisional ‘Deep’ battlespace is vital for gaining an information advantage to enable more suc- cessful land manoeuvre at the divisional level1. But given the current Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabili- ties of our peer/+2 enemies these activities are highly likely to be exposed to enemy view. This short piece examines the operating environment for ground reconnaissance forces from the perspec- tive of ‘red forces’ ISR and makes deductions to shape our cur- rent recce tactics thinking and WARDEV3.
Whither Reconnaissance by Stealth??
As noted in the foreword to ADP Land Operations, we live and fight in a ‘goldfish bowl’; the sense that all activity must be con- sidered exposed to enemy view. Our likely adversaries are adept at seeing, identifying and acquiring us, consequently we must revisit and better understand our own approach to reconnais- sance tactics and training. We have long relied on the old recon- naissance mantra ‘recce by stealth’, but it is evident that as a broad approach this is now outdated and needs modernising. In a sense we need to get better at operating even though exposed, and do so in a way that maximises our effectiveness and mini- mises physical risk.
Divisional level Ground Reconnaissance
3rd (UK) Division has invested heavily in new Intelligence, Sur- veillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities thickening its ability to develop tactical insight and hasten decision-making. These capabilities are commonly grouped together under the Divisional Information Manoeuvre Group (DIMG). Within this broader ISR field, Ground Reconnaissance forces are deployed. Acting at the formation level4, they are known as the Divisional Reconnaissance Battle Group (DRBG) and are built around an Armoured Cavalry Battlegroup.
1 Accepting that 3rd(UK) Division is most likely to be fighting as part of a NATO mission within a Corps construct.
2 Meaning both peer threats and peer + threats.
3 Warfare Development
4 A constant in armoured warfare. Formally referred to as; Div Recce, Forma- tion Recce or Medium Reconnaissance.
The DRBG operates as a key element of the covering force in the divisional deep battlespace supporting two taskmasters: The DIMG on ‘find to decide’ activities (persistent and timely infor- mation to enable the Divisional Commander’s decision-making; particularly important recce ‘eyes-on verification’ in the age of dis- information), and the Operational Support Group (OSG) on ‘find to strike’ activities (i.e. including queuing strikes on HVT/ HPT5).
The ‘red force’ peer/ + ISR threat
Whilst the threats facing ground reconnaissance forces are highly variable and situationally dependent, we can assume our peer/+ adversaries will field most if not all of the following against us:
• Aerial ISR. Our adversaries’ ISR capabilities and air power resources mean that we must now expect periods of enemy air superiority. Therefore, particularly for recce forces act- ing in front of the Divisional main body, we must assume that an adversary will conduct ISR collection against recce elements from a range of platforms; be that from air-breath- ing fixed or rotary wing platforms, or from Unmanned Aer- ial Systems.
• Conventional Ground Reconnaissance activities. Our ad- versaries will use ground-based reconnaissance forces at Corps, DTG, BTG and Bn levels. This matrix of recce forces will be collecting data on our movements and tracking our recce forces as they manoeuvre.
• Cyber and Electromagnetic ISR Activities. We must assume that conventional battlefield communications signatures will be identifiable even with the tightest workable restric- tions on Electro-magnetic control (EMCON). We must also assume from an unconventional communications perspec- tive that big picture data collection will complement bat- tlefield collection. Our divisional order of battle will be ac- cessible through open source material and the UK media. But also personal electronic device patterns of behaviour will have changed noticeably presenting additional clues to the enemy.
• Special ISR capabilities. We must assume that there will be a range of special collection methods and activities work- ing against us. These will range from SOF elements to Hu- man intelligence source (HUMINT) agents, and resistance movements, to local sympathisers. All of which will be feed- ing a collective picture of what our manoeuvre forces are seeking to do.
Our ability to understand what has been collected against us and what is understood from this collection is limited. There- fore given the range and breadth of capabilities we must accept a
5 High Value Target/ High Payoff Target.
Reconnaissance Forces