Page 11 - The Royal Lancers Chapka 2018

REGIMENTAL JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL LANCERS (QUEEN ELIZABETHS’ OWN) 9 strong likelihood that much is understood, including our broad
laydown and movement.
Reconnaissance in a goldfish bowl; ‘so what’ for
our Ground Reconnaissance elements?
Importance of time and space in divisional level decision-mak- ing. The ‘recce gap’ is critical for success. By gap we mean both time and space to decide. Reconnaissance forces offer the divi- sional commander a persistent presence on the battlefield, veri- fied information, and timely insight to enable – with feeds from other ISR capabilities – the division to manoeuvre to a position of decisive advantage over its opponent. This critical skill set does not currently get the training it needs. Training resources are heavily biased to the ‘close’ battle at the expense of the ‘deep’. We need to get after these critical synergies to develop a clearer sense of what time and space mean within the current context, and bring this critical data into our planning.
Separation Drivers. Operating a ‘recce gap’ induces risks to the force which need to be balanced off against the risk to the mis- sion. The functional framework for capturing, analysing and mitigating the exaggerated risk of acting in advance of the main body is commonly known as ‘separation drivers’ (i.e.; fires, log, med, ES, C2, manoeuvre support). Set within a more nuanced understanding of the enemy ISR threat to recce forces we must develop greater staff familiarity with separation driver planning data, to improve divisional planning and staff anticipation to drive down risk to force.
Develop training realism. Whilst the conceptual development of the warfighting Division has made rapid advancement, the physical training for the recce troops lags. Our recce must train in a similar environment to one that it fights within; the current training estates are simply not designed to develop ground recce experts. As we know, the battlespace will likely be a complex and demanding environment, full of people and the clutter of the countryside – an environment we struggle to present on the ster- ile training areas of Salisbury and Alberta; we must adapt. Train- ing should be conducted where recce soldiers can experience the full ‘goldfish bowl’. Public and private land within the UK offer great opportunities to develop the recce mind-set. But training like this comes at a cost. First, tracked vehicles are not appro- priate routinely for this type of training, so vehicle surrogacy6 becomes more important. Clearly this has fleet implications and increases complexity at unit level in terms of FGen and fleet management. Second, whilst surrogacy offers great opportunity, it accepts that some elements of training are not conducted on core platform and others not at all (TES, full ground manoeuvre, restricted freedom of movement, public safety).
Adapting doctrine and training. We still train too two-dimen- sionally; we are not good enough at retuning our recce tactics
6 Surrogacy; getting at one thing by leveraging another less precious resource. RL have made use of Land Rovers at regimental level to train across public and private land on Ex NORTHERN LANCER (2017).
and doctrine to the ever-changing threat envelop. Not enough thought is given in training to the implications of the broad range of enemy ISR threats. We focus too much on training against enemy ground recce forces (and occasionally some ele- ments of the air domain), but little on other aspects.
Redefine and enforce EMCON states. We need to redefine what we need from our EMCON states. Taken to an extreme, op- pressive EMCON makes ground recce work almost impossible. Thought is needed to balance the risk to force against risk to mission for ground recce forces in this key area. EMCON states that work for a ‘close’ Bde will have a different impact on a Di- visional Reconnaissance Battle Group. More deliberate calcula- tion and nuance is required, and it needs to find its way into ground recce training.
Ground reconnaissance manoeuvre tactics. We need to update our ground reconnaissance tactics to operate effectively within this threat context. By accepting that enemy ISR will have acquired our recce forces, we must also accept that the concept of recce by stealth is dead as a general construct. Instead we must think through in detail the implications for ground recce forces. First, the physical layout of ground recce forces (and signature assets) across the battlefield must not prejudice or betray the divisional plan7. We must mask the ground recce mission focus/ priorities within a broader noise and deception plan. Second, dispersal is essential to drive down risk to force. We must assume that the enemy is unwilling to unmask guns and manoeuvre forces against recce, preferring to let it pass whilst keeping key assets hidden. By concentrating we present increasingly worthy target sets to the enemy which could prove catastrophic for us if the enemy chooses to act. We need to review ground recce tactics and procedures to ensure that throughout training dispersal is a key feature. Third, the recce communications profile needs to be light and resilient. HF is likely to be the only means by which ground recce can com- municate with the Div HQ restricting the volume of information moving between the two. This challenging comms-link needs test- ing and training more effectively. Recce C2 nodes need to become much more skilful in the art of HF and develop new procedures to compress and make more effective that link. They also need to be smaller and more mobile. Fourth, more thought is needed to zero tactical manoeuvre training for ground recce troops. More on communications, vehicle maintenance and navigation (in a GPS denied environment); and for example, less on direct fire engage- ments – which are more of a lifesaving ‘contact drill’.
Conclusion
This short note has made the case that advances in enemy ISR ca- pabilities and the all-seeing environment presents challenges to our core reconnaissance philosophy. We have been slow to modernise our recce forces, and substantially more effort is needed to adapt our tactics and procedures to be more competitive on the battlefield.
7 i.e. recce forces heavily concentrated at key obstacle crossing sites.