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The UK Defence Industry in the 21 Century
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The Five Forces of Americanisation
The UK’s experience makes it clear that the act of designing, manufacturing, selling and supporting
systems and equipment creates and makes practical use of technology. Technology that can be
applied to other, commercial applications. More fundamentally, technology that can win wars.
Controlling such technology is therefore vital.
In 2005, while UK Armed Forces were operating alongside US forces in Iraq, both Prime Minister Tony
Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw were repeatedly asking US President George Bush to set aside
American technology transfer regulations and grant the UK an ITAR waiver. This would enable UK
forces to operate entirely collaboratively with US forces on the battlefield. Their requests were
consistently rejected.
“We were greatly disappointed that the Congress deleted the provisions for an ITAR exemption
from the Defence Authorisation Act … It has been a constant source of discussion between the
Prime Minister and President Bush, Secretary Powell and myself and our officials. It is
disappointing. The administration did its best. On these issues it is for the Executive to propose
and for Congress to dispose and they came to a different view. It is disappointing, particularly
given what a close and reliable ally we have been for the United States through thick and thin.”
(Jack Straw, UK Foreign Secretary. House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs;
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Minutes of Evidence, 12 January, 2005)
The Iraq war polarised the views of the US-UK alliance and those of France and Germany but the UK
has aimed to maintain a balanced position in support of both European and American peace and
security; in 2011, through joint air and naval operations with France in Libya, for example, and now,
in supporting Ukraine’s defence against Russia. Despite the reality of the UK deciding to leave the EU
in 2016, trading off the economic consequences in search of sovereign independence, this appears to
have been successful, since, in the early weeks of 2025, circumstance have changed dramatically. In
his 2024 meetings with Olaf Scholz and Emmanuel Macron, new British Prime Minister, Sir Keir
Starmer, cited defence as a major feature of prospective treaties with Germany and France within the
context of building closer ties with Europe. Starmer’s subsequent meeting with the then US President
Biden in Washington focused on increasing military support to Ukraine, with news media accentuating
the importance of the USA approving the use of an Anglo-French MBDA (Storm Shadow) long-range
weapon system. Whilst this illustrates the interconnected nature of the modern weapons market, it
also show how the US uses its control of technology to exert power and apply direction beyond its
shores. Just as George Bush’s closest ally Tony Blair found in Iraq 20 years ago, non-US countries may
buy US equipment but they need US permission before using it. Even America’s closest allies.
“Apache helicopters, despite being built in the United Kingdom, had source codes that were
purposely inaccessible to the British armed forces to analyze or for British industry to add new
capabilities. Any additions required the aircraft to be returned to the United States and
negotiated for modifications. Similarly, the F-35 program, despite Britain being a Tier 1 partner,
has its “black box” content restricted along with other parts of the aircraft under the F-35 Special
Access Program.
“Whilst the United States is Britain’s closest ally, the polarized nature of American politics does
not guarantee this state will endure for the 50 or more years of the F-35’s operational lifespan.“
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(William Reynolds PhD, “War on the Rocks”; 3 January, 2025)
The US ITAR also bring further benefits to the US. In the world of corporate Mergers & Acquisitions
(“M&A”), through restricting or preventing the sharing of US technology, they discourage the
integration of any US defence business with those owned by a foreign acquirer. Since integration is a
major driver of value in M&A, this frustrates the ambition of a non-American acquirer to unlock the
synergistic benefits to be gained from an American acquisition. Unless, of course, the acquirer
relocates all of the combined business in the US and makes sure that only US employees have access
to its technology, as was the dilemma for BAE Systems when it acquired Lockheed Martin’s Sanders
Aerospace Electronics Systems business in 2000. Five years later, BAE first merged then sold the
entirety of its UK electronics business to Italian group Leonardo (then called Finmeccanica). As a result,
BAE Systems is the sole supplier of electronic warfare (“EW”) systems for 5th generation aircraft,
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07/07/2025 Richard Hooke 2025

