Page 15 - GALIET FORMS AND UNFORMS: Aristotle´s Refutation to Plato IV
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field of human endeavor because the good depends not on a Platonic singularity of being but rather on a multivocity of being: on substance, on quality, on quantity, on relation, on time and on place (1096b, 23-28). Although Aristotle does not allude to his remaining categories (position, possession, doing and undergoing)9 in the Nicomachean Ethics, he probably did mean to include them. According to his theory, Aristotle posits that by predicating these modes of being we can give a true account of reality; whether than representation of reality is lesser, immoral or more imperfect than Plato’s, he does not say. Plato instead would argue that Aristotle’s predications10 exist and dwell in the sub-reality of images cast in the darkness of his cavern and far removed from true knowledge. He would base his argument by stating that Aristotle’s logic predications, whether true or false or whether they lend themselves to valid or invalid arguments, reflect and justify our sensory delusions and vices by creating weak structures, a sort of “reality lottery,” that serves to justify abhorrent religious, social and moral prejudices and imperfections rather than achieve the highest form of the Good: Justice. In addition, Aristotle’s “predicative argument” implies separating the “doer from the doing” 3⁄4 Pygmalion from Galatea 3⁄4 which is an impossibility to Nietzsche and to Plato. Nietzsche, in his First Treatise titled
9 Barnes, Jonathan, ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Princeton/Bolinger Seriesa LXXI. 2. New Jersey: USA: Princeton University Press. 1995,
10 Greeks, except for Plato and descendants of Parmenides, had a static way of thinking, they conceived of “being” as presence and as substance maybe as a result of the indo- European linguistic structure of subject-predicate while Hebrew had a dynamic form of thinking where “being” is explained as “Hayah” or “God is God”.
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