Page 17 - GALIET FORMS AND UNFORMS: Aristotle´s Refutation to Plato IV
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republic relies on his fundamental reflective equilibrium principle: the tripartite “just soul-just city” notion (Rep IV, 434d-441d).13 Plato would argue that each act of “doing” or “making” would belong to one of these three soul-city categories: reason (logos), spirit (thumos) and appetite (epithumia), in condescending order. He would conclude, therefore, that some acts of doing belong to a lesser realm (ordinary trades, crafts and professions) while others belong to a greater one (the military class and the guardians), thus, creating an ethical and epistemological hierarchy. Hence, Plato, once again, moralizes Nietzsche’s “doing-doing” theory while Aristotle does not have an answer because he does not really inquiry as deeply as Plato into the meaning of the Good.
Aristotle also criticizes the concept of “one form” because, in his view, it justifies the existence of only one science when in reality there are many good sciences, particularly, “many sciences even of the things that fall under one category of the Good” (1096b, 32). Yet, Plato would argue, that although sciences are good in themselves they are not good if used for unjust purposes. Medicine can equally heal and poison, just as can excessive or little gymnastics damage the body; consequently, all sciences must conform to the highest form 3⁄4 Good 3⁄4 including poetics. As an example, poetry, to Socrates, is to be censored if it does not conform to the form of the Good:
13 Grube, G.M.A. Trans. Plato Republic. Indianapolis, USA: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1992.
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