Page 24 - GALIET METAPOIESIS AND TRUTH IV+

Galiet & Galiet
i. Correctness of speech and belief (epistemological)
ii. The reality of being (ontological)
iii. The genuineness, truthfulness and conscientiousness of an individual
or character (existential)
Friedlander ignores an existing reference in the Oxford Greek-English Lexicon to αληθης as unconcealed, though no example of its usage is shown.
However, Heidegger concedes in his failure to find instances of aletheia as ‘unhiddenness’ in Plato.82 (He may, though, have benefited by looking at Homeric texts, too, for Friedlander may have overlooked certain nuances of alethes). When Plato posits of the things made by humans by holding up a mirror are not beings, tei aletheiai (true, real) and that the things painters make are not alethe (true, real),83 Friedlander claims Heidegger interprets these images, things in mirrors and in paintings, as not ‘unhidden.’ Heidegger contends that it is necessary to understand the meaning of ‘make’ in its relevant Grecian sense.84 To ‘make, do, create, fabricate’ is derived from the verb ποιω, the root of poiesis or ποιεσις.85 Friedlander argues that for Plato things in a mirror are not real: they are not alethe ontologically. Equally, he posits that Plato’s Idea, and its near-synonym eidos, “form,” do not mean ‘aspect, appearance.’ Lastly, he claims that Greeks did not invariably use words according to their etymologies.86
3. The above three views of Aletheia are expressed in Plato. The prisoner’s ascent from the cave is one (i) of knowledge, (ii) of being, and (iii) of existence. Friedlander claims Heidegger misunderstands Plato’s ascension. He assumes that if Plato regards truth as correctness of apprehension (noesis), Plato jettisons its other senses while if another sense reappears Plato is ambiguous. Friedlander insists the three senses are fused in Plato.
82 Heidegger. The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking. In Krell. 431-449 See also 77, 447.
83 The Mirror. The idea of mimesis, as many others, appears in Plato, ever so close to its most effective metaphor: the mirror. In Book X of The Republic, Plato argues: ‘The craftsman could make all these things...even you could make it quickly and in lots of places, especially if you were willing to carry a mirror with you, for that’s the quickest way of all. With it you can quickly make the sun, the things in the heavens, the earth, yourself, the other animals, manufactured items, plants, and everything else mentioned just now.’ Plato. Republic. Trans. By G.M.A. Grube. Dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon. Book X. 596d-e 266.
84 Nietzsche. Vol. I: The Will to Power as Art. Trans. D.F. Krell. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. 177, 206.
85 From Liddell & Scott. An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1889.
86 Nietzsche. Vol. I: The Will to Power as Art. Trans. D.F. Krell. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. 200/ni, 172).
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