Page 26 - GALIET METAPOIESIS AND TRUTH IV+

Galiet & Galiet
themselves and the moon and starry heavens afterwards, then to the prisoner’s direct gaze towards the natural sun itself as it is in itself,93 without any reflections. In a way, Plato’s ascension is one from νομος (up to the third segment) to φυσις (the last segment).
4. Lastly, for Friedlander, Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as unhiddenness or unconcealment implies subjectivity. Unhiddenness must be still unhiddenness to someone.
Friedlander seems mistaken.94 If truth for Heidegger belongs to the totality of reality, beings, being and the world and connotes grasping the unconcealed as such, it does not necessarily suggest subjectivity, but a form of objective presence in the many. In this, he is closer to Aristotle. For him, phusis, as for Aristotle, the Ideas are immanent to sensible things, the one is not juxtaposed to the Many, instead, it is immanent to the multiple. Things, being and beings in the world are, in relation to his view on phusis, unconcealed naturally in themselves, that is, in a presence that ‘appears’ and that is ‘hidden’ in its own appearing. The Greek notion of Idea has multiple meanings: the visual aspect of entities,95 the logical aspect when it equates with a concept, the psychological aspect when it equates with a mental entity, the ontological, metaphysical aspect when it equates with a given reality. One needs to study how both the Greek notions of Idea and Eidos (Form) become associated or linked as synonyms. Greek Idea, in its original sense, indeed can mean appearance or the visual aspect of entities, as Heidegger posits; however, as a Platonic Form it no longer means appearance, but reality.
Moreover, as Inwood posits, Friedlander neglects Heidegger’s distinction between the open and the unconcealing of particular beings. In Heidegger’s view, beings and being are revealed in the opening of the open, in the clearing of language and of being. In other words, truth is unhidden. Truth
93 i.e. here Plato, by analogy to the Line, insinuates the intelligible Form of the Good-in-itself.
94 Inwood claims Friedlander “neglects Heidegger’s distinction between the open and the unconcealing of particular beings, and his belief that we are made, and revealed, as, what we are by the opening of the open, not ready-made waiting for things to be unhidden to us.” I have presented my observations on this in the next paragraph. Cited in Inwood, Michael. A Heidegger Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999. 15
95 This vision, in the Greek sense, refers to the aspect of figure that a thing offers when seen. Liddell & Scott. An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1889. “Idea” meant the aspect of the thing as it is factually seen. The Idea designates what is seen of a thing when a certain aspect of it is contemplated.
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