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CAMPAIGN Winter 2021
involved. The living and working conditions in all locations were physically and mentally challenging. Areas around Emu Field, Maralinga and the Montebello Islands are partially inaccessible due to the British nuclear testing, with hour-long restrictions still in place for visitors at Trimouille and Alpha Islands in the archipelago due to remaining radiation (Maralinga Tours 2021; Australia’s Northwest 2020). Emu Field is a flat sandstone plateau in the Great Victoria Desert, a place prone to sandstorms, water shortages and excessive dry heat.
Participants’ service was spent in preparation for the testing and/or clean-up operations of different forms of nuclear fission by an assortment of methods (air, tower, surface-burst, ground burst, barge and balloon from 1 kiloton to 3 megatons in the Commonwealth tests and up to 7.7 megatons at Operation Dominic). Testing also comprised of experimenting with chemical combinations of plutonium, beryllium and uranium (Minor Trials) which had never been tested before, ever-increasing yields (Operation Mosaic and Operation Grapple) and the secret use of the radioactive Cobalt 60 (Co-60) at Operation Antler, Tadje.
Proof of a significant degree of risk to life and limb, and rigour
The following section concentrates on aspects of the evidence reclaimed over recent years concerning individual operations. The attached documents reveal multiple significant dangers to life and limb, the lack and inaccuracy of personal radiation readings, the possible and potential inhalation/ingestion of radioactive isotopes, radioactive contamination of everyday items, and an overall lack
of health and safety around deadly substances, posing a significant danger to life.
Operation Hurricane
The BNTVA has documentary evidence that naval personnel on specific ships were exposed to radioactive substances. Regarding the contamination of ships at Operation Hurricane, shown in Document 1,
the danger of potential inhalation and ingestion of radioactive isotopes was expressed, as was the length of time about the danger of these isotopes. “Nevertheless, small local concentrations of radioactive contamination were built up in such places as underwater inlets, condensers, evaporators, cable lockers etc. Certain items of ships’ gear and equipment such as boots, anchors and cables have also been contaminated.” Contamination became a menace as it was invisible and found in places where men could easily encounter it whilst fulfilling their daily duties.
Document 2 states, “Radiological safety must be one of the chief concerns of the Naval Commander but, equally evidently, some degree of risk must be run by some people of we are to achieve the full purpose of the trial.” Whilst the military commanders were concerned about health and safety, they recognised that some service personnel needed to take risks for the success of these operations but do not specify who these people are. The document continues to state that if safety was a priority, then it would be unachievable to carry out the “scientific purposes of the trial.
As Naval Commander I must expect to have to order or approve the acceptance of some sort of risk.”
To order or approve the acceptance of some sort of risk is ambiguous yet shows the seriousness of what would transpire through the nuclear tests, specifically Operation Hurricane in this instance, for the personnel involved, “whether or not they are volunteers for any or all of their duty.” Even at this time, the military commanders were aware that the effects of radiation exposure may arise years after the operations took place, even at this first test.
The BNTVA has evidence referring to Operations Hurricane and Totem One, shown in Document 3, stating that in many cases, the dose of beta radiation was estimated “owing to the impracticability of measuring each individual’s dose directly.” Many personnel were not issued with film badges and thus the doses received by these servicemen are relatively unknown, although we have acquired recent unpublished figures from Public Health England. No figures were available for radiation doses received by the personnel of 82(B) Wing in both operations; The UK authorities assumed readings to be negligible. This will be examined later in connection to the cloud flyers and
at Maralinga.
Operation Totem
Document 3 reveals that ground staff who serviced the Lincoln bombers “may have ingested radioactive fission products. This could have occurred in the few days after Totem One before strict health control measures were introduced at Woomera... Nevertheless, the danger did exist.” Personnel took risks to personal safety by participating in operations before strict health and safety measures were introduced.