Page 11 - CAMPAIGN Winter 2021

The question asked is why were strict health and safety measures not in before Operation Totem One? Totem One was preceded by three British extremely risky “Kitten” tests, which used polonium-210, beryllium and natural uranium to test neutron initiators. Totem One was a scheduled detonation of 3 kilotons of TNT, which Penney then estimated to be around 10 kilotons of TNT after detonation. For the personnel involved, the lack of strict health and safety measures would have contributed to the risk and rigour that they experienced.
Operation Mosaic and Operation Buffalo
Document 4 states that, “The Navy requires information on effects of various types of atomic explosions on ships and their contents and equipment...The Army must discover the detailed effects of various types of explosion on equipment, stores and men with and without various forms of protection.” Serving personnel were ordered to take risks to obtain information of value to the military, including a number of personnel not being handed any form of protection to perform their duty at these unique and potentially dangerous tests. These men were open to the unnatural elements with no defence as a result of the atom bomb, effectively unarmed against invisible radiation, which is something unheard of within the military.
The Australians asked for filters which had been obtained at Operations Mosaic and Buffalo in 1956. Penney states in Document 5 that, “...If they ask us, we give them a little piece of the filters, but that we wait for a few days so that some of the short-life isotopes have decayed
a good deal.” This document shows intentional alterations to reduce the actual level of isotopes to minimise concern about the level of danger before giving the data to the Australians.
Operation Buffalo
Document 6 reveals that the Committee had an educated knowledge of the effects of radiation, and the significant risk to life and limb through potential genetic effects, set out in a government memo. On considering the Prime Minister’s response to, “The report of the committee considering the genetic effects of radiation. His comment was, “A pity, but we cannot help it.” The future consequences of experiencing possible genetic effects of radiation has contributed to long term fears and chronic anxiety amongst the personnel involved in the testing.”
Operation Grapple
Document 7 relates to a letter from Sir Cyril Musgrave in 1957 at Operation Grapple. The Scientific Director was prepared to take risks in testing a new type of weapon, the thermonuclear bomb, which the military commanders did not fully understand. It states to “hand over certain experimental bombs to the military commander” as the UK had chosen to gain scientific information using military methods. There may be a number of dangerous situations including “the bombing plane may lose an aileron or something else which makes it unable to drop the bomb safely, the bomb may hook up, the target may be obscured by cloud by the time the planes arrives. The plane may crash on take-off, or on abortive return, and several people may be killed.”
Further risk is described in that “by a combination of good judgment and good luck, the off-site fall-out from Buffalo, Australia, was minute” despite a low dose of radiation passing over Maralinga Village after Buffalo Kite (McClelland 1985, p. 294). A memo states that “To put a military commander in the position would be extremely risky, and to put a scientific director who had to admit that he was not in absolute command would be nearly as bad.” The dilemma continued throughout the tests that the military should remain in control, yet the very risky tests depended on the skill of the scientists. This debate put the serving personnel in a very vulnerable position between the military and the scientists, as certainty, knowledge and skill were needed to avert risks for these untested weapons.
Cloud samplers
The RAF cloud samplers were extremely brave men who carried out an extremely risky and rigorous job by taking readings from the air of radioactive fallout generally just after the bombs were detonated. Depending on the sortie, they flew next to the mushroom cloud or through the cloud to take the readings.
MacLellan 2017, pp. 169-170, cited McClelland 1985 p. 203 regarding the first time a Canberra bomber was flown through the mushroom cloud by RAF pilot Geoffrey Dhenin to take radiation samples at Operation Totem, 1953. Dhenin flew at 30,000 feet through the base and the top of the mushroom cloud. On return to base, he and two other crew members were contaminated with high doses of gamma radiation (estimated at 18r, 19r and 21r). The RAF continued to send cloud samplers
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CAMPAIGN WINTER 2021