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Contaminated water fell on him from the wing, and he was soaked. Although distressed by the event, he carried on working to get the job done, rather than leave to undergo decontamination.
Operation Buffalo and Operation Antler
Document 9 reveals that personnel were part of a nuclear experiment, which far surpasses normal duties. During Operation Antler, “The RAF will gain invaluable experience in handling the weapons and demonstrating first-hand the effects of nuclear explosions on personnel and equipment.” Further risk is shown at Maralinga in document 10, that all personnel “may be exposed to radiation in the course of their military duties.” The concept of demonstrating effects of the nuclear explosions on personnel shows that the personnel who experienced exposure to radiation (and potential exposure) through nuclear testing were incredibly vulnerable and brave, not to mention that they were put in a position of great risk and rigour by their superiors.
Documentary observations pertaining to risk and rigour
From numerous accounts and Pathe films available online, it is clear to see personnel paraded to witness the nuclear detonations with the majority standing lined up in their shorts, sandals and short sleeved shirts (Imperial War Museum 1993). Indeed, during some tests they were told to remove their shirts immediately after detonation and stand with their backs facing the flash of light. One account from a Christmas Island RAF veteran from Operation Grapple states that his shirt melted to his back after
witnessing a thermonuclear blast, and he still bears the scars (information is available on request).
Document 11 reveals an alternative complexion on the interpretation and delivery to the media by warning against the release of statements regarding genetic effects, strontium or radioactivity before Penney arrived. The final sentence states,
A safer interpretation of the MRC Report in the last sentence of the paragraph 4 would be, “has not shown an increase” rather than “shows an increase”. This is a deliberate attempt to give inaccurate information concerning the dangers of the British nuclear testing hence minimizing the reality of the risk involved.
Document 12 states that the Prime Minister has raised the possibility of limiting nuclear tests to one per year “to limit the genetic hazards.
” Penney preferred the idea of rationing megatons rather than limiting the number of radioactive explosions. This document is further evidence of knowledge at the time of potential genetic issues, and the potential serious invisible risks concerning the onset of genetic damage for the nuclear test participants.
Document 17, from the Head of Health Effects at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), written in 1999, states to the widow of a nuclear test veteran that AWE staff from the nuclear tests confirmed that film badges were handed to all participants of Operation Buffalo. However, the letter then explains, “I cannot say why more detailed records of film badge issue were not kept. There was no statutory requirement at the time to do so.”
Cook et al. 2021 explain that six particles were taken from Operation Antler Taranaki (26.6 kiloton balloon drop) Ground Zero at Maralinga in 1984. They were stored in ambient conditions by the Australian Radiation and Nuclear Radiation Safety Agency and recently analysed. Findings show a decoupling of plutonium and uranium geochemistry, with particles showing a low-valence state. This is unexpected for particles that survived for around 30 years in the environment they were located in, and this consequently shows that risks were the same for clean-up workers as for participants at the actual tests. “At Maralinga, the particles contain Pu (and U) in the form of high temperature, anhydrous phrases, that are far from equilibrium with respect to experimental conditions. Dissolution via digestion of the metallic matrix of the particle (Fe-, Al- or Pb- rich alloys) could result in further release of Pu-rich nanoparticles.” This toxicity is dangerous due to the limited size of the tiny particles, which could easily move as dust or in groundwater, hence still posing a contemporary problem. Particles such as these could easily have been ingested at Maralinga as dust in the open desert conditions, imposing a risk at the time of the British nuclear tests and beyond.
McClelland 1985, pp. 388-393, investigated the “Cobalt-60 Incident” at Operation Antler Tadje Ground Zero in 1958. Routine surveys for radioactivity revealed high radiation levels. On closer inspection, tiny pellets of Co-60 were retrieved from the area. The pellets were so small that they could have easily been ingested, and, in fact, the man who retrieved the pellets (Brindley)
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CAMPAIGN WINTER 2021