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protective clothing, then test themselves with a Geiger Counter (Imperial War Museum 1993).
Within the documentation concerning War Pensions’ evidence, which culminated in successful claims, Mr P’s evidence accepted from his brother sates that Mr P, as an RAF cook by trade, was despatched to the desert to pick up a firing mechanism at Ground Zero. This action is full of both risk and rigour, and outside his normal remit of duty. The consultant haematologist states that concerning Mr R, a medically significant degree of radiation did occur at the atmospheric tests, despite low or negligible radiation readings shown.
The very fact of participatory service within these tests causes a “perceived radiation exposure” (if not actual) within “excessive psychological stress” at the time of being in a risky environment, touched on within Mr R’s consultant’s report. Collett et al. 2020 reveal neurocognitive “anomalies at hippocampal and cortical level” even with limited radiation exposure, as so many mental processes are involved in working in this arduous environment, including witnessing a nuclear bomb, or perceived fears from the fallout of ionizing radiation (p. 1105 and p. 1109). Changes in identity, lifestyle and worldview are common, revealed through effects of trauma (Jones 2020).
Rohrmann (2008) introduces a model of risk perception of dread risk and unknown risk. Within the context of radiation exposure or perceived radiation exposure, this refers to the negative health effects on the individual concerned from that time, including a higher physical inflammatory response through a psychological trigger. These personnel showed trepidation concerning their roles in
the nuclear tests. For JF, the experience was utterly terrifying, and no specific training was given to him in undertaking such an unprecedented role on multiple occasions. The psychological effects from the very moment of commencing cloud flying can be apparent, enough to cause a hand tremor, a sign of post-traumatic stress disorder and mental anguish, which he hadn’t experienced before his first cloud sampling sortie.
The evidence given for Mr R’s war pension by the medical consultant states that negligible radiation readings or lack of readings do not mean that risk did not exist at the British/Commonwealth nuclear tests. Both applications show that war pensions were awarded by the MoD under the premise that both applicants’ cancers were military attributable from the nuclear tests. Risk was everywhere, including for two RAF Canberra crew who lost their lives in Newfoundland as they returned radiation cloud samples from Operation Grapple (MacLellan 2017, p. 171).
The evidence reveals reasons to minimise the severity of the situation at each operation. There are always risks to testing new technology, and these nuclear tests were no different. Mistakes could be extremely dangerous for all involved (potentially to thousands of men at each test). It is apparent that participants were asked to sign the Official Secrets’ Act and were then given tasks way beyond the call of their normal remit, which they successfully performed. This would never be allowed in today’s British military.
The confidentiality involved in abiding by the Official Secrets’ Act concerning these traumatic nuclear tests has caused undue psychological stress to thousands of nuclear test veterans
over the decades since the time of the tests. Even the thousands of men who were ordered to observe the blasts were mostly unaware of their part as subjects in an experiment, as demonstrated concerning the HMS Diana, the cloud flyers, and the Indoctrinee Force at Operation Buffalo. There really is nothing normal in observing the detonation of nuclear weapons; It is profound and a harrowing experience, even for senior officers like Captain Gower, who described the risky role that the HMS Diana crew took, as well as a morally wrong instruction. What made matters worse for personnel was the lack of protective equipment whilst viewing the bombs and experiencing the aftermath of fallout.
The British nuclear test participants were wholly at the mercy of these events for up to two years at a time, so it is interesting to read that Operation Buffalo radiation levels were low due to “good judgement and good luck” according to Penney (document 7), yet radiation moved over Maralinga Village, where personnel were situated. This was no success (McClelland 1985, p. 299).
A mental rigour was imposed on all test participants, which, over the decades, for those who live to this day, has deepened. There is no doubt, that on speaking to hundreds of British nuclear test participants, they served in potentially dangerous and adverse conditions, driven to the very limits of their fears. The word “tests” does not describe the magnitude of experience of either risk or rigour that they endured; The label “experiments” is more apt.
Moral Injury
Additionally, the element of moral injury should be noted within the context of risk and rigour.
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CAMPAIGN WINTER 2021