Page 14 - CAMPAIGN Winter 2021

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CAMPAIGN Winter 2021
hadn’t touched them, but the ends
of his fingertips turned red according to his statement at the Royal Commission (McClelland 1985,
p. 391); “A Royal Australian Navy surgeon who had just completed a course in nuclear medicine in the UK” informed Brindley that his injury was due to beta radiation. The discovery of Co-60 had been reported to the AWRE on 10 July 1958, stating that the largest pellet registered at “36 r/he when touching a 1390.”
This incident shows a lack of specific safety measures around this radioactive substance and of not making service personnel aware of the dangers they were under.
Document 13 focuses on the flying of ‘hot’ radioactive Canberra aeroplanes by 76 Squadron to Nandi and Canton Island. The authorities were to be informed that “the aircraft is clean externally, but there may be some radioactivity inside the engine.”
The RAF servicing crew was not issued with protective gear to avoid alerting the authorities, and crews were given a certificate signed by the Health Physics Officer stating,
“This is to certify that during normal transit operations, this aircraft constitutes no radiological hazard, in all aspects covered by the International Commission on Radiological Protection.” The document demonstrates the lack of safety measures for the service personnel at the nuclear tests and therefore reveals a greater risk for the crew.
From examination of the data, the test participants were told that safety precautions were suitable and that there was no danger for personnel. From the evidence, the nuclear test participants faced many dangers. Experiencing both risk and rigour was very real to all nuclear test participants in this enormous
scientific study, for example, the discovery of the lethal Co-60 pellets at Tadje Ground Zero, Maralinga.
Document 14 p. 4 explains that the Higher Integrated Dose of <10r is allowed “to recover important records or information which otherwise be lost.” A Special Integrated Dose of <25r was allowed under permission from the Scientific Director for “essential success for the trial.” Contemporary medical literature states 25r is the lowest dose to cause clinically observable blood changes; This could be from an accumulative dose, not just one instance, and nano-changes may happen before this point in order to cause the observable change yet are not yet scientifically known. Also, in 1958, the recalibration of the film badges considered radiation levels up to 50r from the previous 0.5r, yet the badges were still described as not fit for purpose concerning accurate radiation readings. This may well have clouded the potential risks taken by personnel on the ground and in the air.
Discussion of the physical
and mental stress and rigours
On multiple occasions these documents reveal a great degree of risk. Powell stated, “Penney is right in thinking we should take out an insurance policy” (Arnold and Smith, 2006, pp. 149-150). The British personnel who participated in Operation Dominic did not choose to take part, and in JL’s account it is clearly shown that being present for 25 nuclear tests in a short period of time with only goggles as his personal defence against radioactive fallout and any potential mistake constituted a mental rigour. JD’s account reveals the risk he was put under an RE Fitter in leading the crash party – this was not part of his normal duty. Captain Gower explains
the risk of sailing a ship through radioactive fallout at Operation Mosaic, and the short and long-term physical and psychological effects on the crew. He explains this in addition to showing that radiation at G2 showed 10r yet the men remained on the HMS Diana for another year after the nuclear tests.
Placing men in trenches and in a Centurion tank up to 3200 yards (1.8 miles) from the detonation zone at Operation Buffalo was a risk, let alone a rigour compared to normal service, as well as testing the build-up of immunity to radiation exposure (Wiseman 2020).
JD mentions that when the next thermonuclear hydrogen bomb test was announced at Christmas Island, the atmosphere would instantly change from laughter and talking into a sombre mood. Men would talk to each other about what might happen, and they wondered what the fallout would do to them if anything went wrong with where the bomb was detonated pr the magnitude of explosion. This signified the beginning of a mental rigour which was exacerbated by witnessing the bombs.
Mental rigour and deep psychological distress following the Fukushima disaster includes stigma, chronic anxiety and a fear of radiation (Harada et al. 2015; Kim et al. 2011). The British nuclear test participants relate similar issues including exposure worry to the BNTVA going back to their time spent at the nuclear tests (Collett et al. 2020).
Whether they witnessed one or multiple nuclear bombs, these personnel experienced fear, dread and even feelings of doom. Men at Christmas Island were told to pick up dead seabirds after the tests, without