Page 129 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

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A rough idea of what concepts are can be gleaned from the statement that to possess the concept of an F (say, an uncle) is to know what it is for something to be an F (an uncle). Evidently there is a close relationship between knowing the meaning of a word and possessing the concept expressed by that word. If you know the meaning of uncle then you will possess the concept of an uncle. However, the converse does not hold. You may possess the concept of an uncle yet not know the meaning of the English word uncle. This article focuses on concepts rather than their expression in any particular language, but the issues raised clearly have a bearing on the theoretical rep- resentation of word meanings.
1. ConceptsandPrepositionalAttitudes
What is a concept? Abstractly considered a concept is an ingredient of the content of a prepositional atti- tude. If you believe that interest rates are too high the content of your belief is given by the proposition that interest rates are too high. The concept of interest rates and the concept of what it is for such rates to be too high are ingredients of that proposition. What is it to possess a concept? A plausible, if minimal, answer is that to possess a concept is to possess abilitieswhich are exercised in the management of propositional atti- tudes whose contents contain the concept as an ingredient. Suppose that you believe that Bill is kind. Then you have an attitude to the proposition that Bill is kind, namely, the attitude of taking the proposition to be true. Now if you are capable of forming such an attitude you will also be capable of forming an indefinite number of similar attitudes to the effect that such-and-such a person is kind, for example, the beliefs that Mary is kind, that John is kind, that Zelda
is kind, etc. So it seems natural to think of the abilities in which possessing the concept of being kind consists as including the ability to form beliefs of this type. Similarly, if you want Bill to be kind then, arguably, you have an attitude to the proposition that Bill is kind, this time the attitude of wanting it to be true. Abilities associated with the concept of being kind would be exercised in the formation of such desires.
The concept of being kind is predicative insofar as it is expressible by means of a predicate. Not all con- cepts are of this predicative type. Suppose you believe that if interest rates stay high then the government will lose the election. One may think of the formation of that belief as involving the exercise of abilities which in English are associated with the conditional If- then—. These abilities could be exercised in relation to an indefinite number of other beliefs having the same conditional form. By analogy with descriptive concepts they may be taken to be at least partially constitutive of what it is to possess the logical concept expressible by If—then—. Among examples of other logical concepts are those expressible by and, not, and either—or— .
The approach just outlined might be thought to apply also to proper names like John and Fido. After all, if you believe that John is bald then you are exercis- ing abilities which may also be exercised in the for- mation of other beliefs to the effect that John is such- and-such. Why not regard such abilities as constitutive of possession of a concept associated with the proper name John! If this terminology is adopted great care must be taken in spelling out precisely what such abilities amount to. There are well-known difficulties in equating the concept associated with a proper name
Concepts A. Millar
Concepts
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