Page 130 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

Truth and Meaning
with the concept expressed by some singular descrip- tion which applies to the bearer of the name.
2. Conceptual Abilities
If the approach proposed above is along the right lines then a major task for a theory of concepts is to specify the structures of diverse conceptual abilities (see Pea- cocke 1992). Granted that conceptual abilities are implicated in the management of beliefs one needs to know what form these abilities take.
Clearly, conceptual abilities are exercised when beliefs are formed on the basis of other beliefs. For example, if you come to believe that interest rates will remain high and you already believe that if interest rates remain high then the government will lose the election then you may, on the basis of these beliefs, form the belief that the government will lose the elec- tion. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that whenever you possess the concept of the conditional If—then— , and believe a particular proposition of the form If p then q, you will form the belief that q provided that you come to believe that p. People do not routinely believe even the obvious implications of what they already believe. Much depends on their current interests and on the extent to which the current beliefs are liable to become activated.
Often when one forms a belief that p on the basis ofbeliefsthatq,r,...onedoessounreflectively.Think of seeing bottles of milk outside a neighbor's apart- ment and coming to believe that the neighbor is still in bed. In these circumstances one would probably not spell out to oneself the relevant premises nor any inference from these premises yielding the relevant conclusion. One would simply come to have a belief in response to the interaction between a perception- based belief and various stored beliefs. But people do sometimes reason in a manner which involves explicitly taking account of inferential links between propositions. Such reasoning brings into play the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid infer- ences and that ability is arguably a further aspect of what is involved in possessing the relevant concepts. So, for example, possessing the concept of the If- then— conditional would bring with it the ability to recognize as valid inferences which instantiate the pat- tern modus ponens: Ifp then q. p. Therefore q.
3. Conceptsand'FamilyResemblance'
Some predicative concepts have definitions spelling out characteristics, possession of which is necessary and sufficient for something to be an instance of the concept. This is true, for example, of kinship concepts like those of an uncle, father, mother, brother, etc. It is widely recognized that not all concepts have defi- nitions in this sense and consequently that mastery of such concepts cannot be represented solely in terms of the ability to employ such definitions. Much of the discussion of this matter by psychologists and
theoretical linguists, as well as philosophers, takes off from Wittgenstein's remarks about games (Wittgenstein 1958). Wittgenstein suggested that it is misguided to look for defining characteristics which are common to everything we regard as a game. Games are related by overlapping family resem- blances. Each game shares some features with some other games though there may be no features which all games share. The idea of a family resemblance concept does not preclude the possibility of there being some features shared by all instances. But such features are not required and even when present are not definitive of the concept. Note that the application of family resemblance concepts has no clear bound- aries since there is no determinate yes or no answer to the question whether putative new cases resemble agreed cases in appropriate ways.
Where a concept is a family resemblance concept the abilities constitutive of its possession cannot plau- sibly be explicated in terms of a grasp of deductive inferential links between propositions to the effect that the concept applies to some thing and propositions ascribing denning characteristics to that thing. This may also be true of natural kind concepts (whether or not they are family resemblance concepts). It is certainly relevant to the mastery of the concept of a lemon that typical ripe lemons are seen as being yellow. Yet we seem to allow for the possibility that a thing may be a ripe lemon though not yellow. If this is so then being yellow when ripe cannot be a denning characteristic of lemons. Putnam has argued (Putnam 1975: ch. 8) that it may be wrong even to think that typical ripe lemons are yellow. Whether or not this is so, some account is required of the role in our thinking of those characteristics which are associated with what are regarded as typical instances of certain concepts, even if they are not defining characteristics for the concept.
Further complications emerge when one takes into account the fact that many concepts can be applied on the basis of perception. One comes to have beliefs not only via other beliefs but also via current sensory experiences. On touching your cup of coffee you may come to believe that it is hot. It is arguable that mas- tery of the concept of being hot which most normal people employ essentially involves an ability to make such transitions from experiences to beliefs (Millar 1991).
4. TheNormativeDimensionofConcepts
According to the approach sketched above the notion of a concept is helpful in describing certain types of ability which are exercised in thinking and, conse- quently, also in the use of language. Concepts have an explanatory role in that they enter into explan- ations of, among other things, the formation, main- tenance, and abandonment of beliefs. An important feature of concepts is that they also have a normative
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