Page 423 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

A speech act is created when speaker/writer S makes an utterance U to hearer/reader H in context C. This entry examines 'indirect' speech acts. Suppose $!
7.45 spoken with a certain pattern of pause, pitch level, stress, and tone of voice, mean'S says it is seven forty-five.' The third step is to recognize what S's locution is being used to denote/refer to: by 'it' S denotes 'the time'; the tense of the main verb indicates that the time S refers to is the present. H therefore concludes: 'S says the present time is seven forty-five.' Step four is to recognize from H's linguistic knowledge that this meets the description for the primary illo- cution of a statement in which it is S's reflexive-inten- tion that H believe that S believes that it is seven forty- five. Up to step four, the inferential process for (2) is identical with that for (1); but thereafter it diverges. In step five H seeks to establish S's illocutionary point by relating the primary illocution to Q , in order to determine S's apparent purpose in uttering Uj. In Q utterance (1) was issued in answer to the question What's the time?, so it is reasonable for H, to assume that the primary illocution has identified the illo- cutionary point because, in saying It's 7.45, S, has satisfactorily answered the question, and there are no further inferences to be drawn. Turning to utterance (2): in C2, H2 knows that S2 has not been asked to tell H2 the time, therefore S2 has some personal motivation for drawing the current time to H2's attention; H2 also knows that S2 knows that S2 and H2 have been getting ready to leave at 7.45 for work. H2 will therefore conclude that S2's motivation must be that because it is 7.45, it is time to leave for work; in other words, S2 reflexively-intends H2 to recognize that 'S2 is saying it is time to leave for work.' Step six is to decide either that this is the illocutionary point of (2) or that some further inference should be drawn. H2 may reason that S2 knows as well as H2 does that if it is time to leave for work but S2 and H2 have not yet done so, then they must hurry. Let us stipulate that in C2, H2 has grounds for believing that S2 believes that S2 is ready to leave for work but S2 may not believe that H2 is also ready (this would be made more probable if S2's tone of voice reveals that s/he is irritated). Given this belief, H2 will conclude that S2 reflexively-intends (2) to be taken as sufficient reason for H2 to hurry up because H2 is delaying their departure and so making them late. Because there is no further inference to draw, H2 will conclude that this is the illocutionary point of (2).
It is often assumed that performative clauses express their illocutionary point directly (see Gazdar 1981); but the analysis of (1) makes this impossible: the primary illocution of a performative clause is that of a statement (see Cohen 1964; Lewis 1970; Bach and
Harnish 1979; Allan 1986). Consider (3):
utters (1) in C , , where it answers the question the time? (1):
It is 7.45.
What's
(1)
Many scholars would call this a 'direct' speech act, because in uttering (1) $! means exactly and literally 'the time now is seven forty-five.' However, (2) is uttered in context C2, in which S2 and spouse H2 share the car to work, and need to leave home by 7.45 in order to arrive on time.
It's 7.45. (2)
Although this is still a bald-on-record statement of the current time it is often called an indirect speech act because S2 means at least 'it is time to leave for work'; and it is quite likely that S2 further implies 'hurry up, you're making us late.'
In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer.
(Searlel975:61)
There is overwhelming evidence that speakers expect hearers to draw inferences from everything that is uttered—just as they do from visual and other data perceived and conceived of—no matter how direct. It follows that H will begin the inferential process immediately on being presented with the locution (the language expression used in the utterance). Rec- ognition of the clause-type used within the locution identifies the primary (or initial) illocution in U, but not necessarily S's illocutionary point. The inferential process will be exemplified by discussion of (1) and (2).
There is a convention that S has some purpose for choosing to utter U; in Q instead of maintaining si- lence or making some other utterance Ux. H tries to guess this purpose in the course of figuring out the illocutionary point of Uj, and in doing so will consider Uj's relevance to the co-text and setting of the utter- ance in the light of beliefs about normal behavior in Q, beliefs about S, and the presumed common ground. Details of the inferential processes with respect to (1) and (2) are as follows. Step one is for H to recognize S's utterance act. Step two is to use H's knowledge of the grammar, lexicon, semantics, and phonology of English to recognize that S's words It's
Indirect Speech Acts K. Allan
Indirect Speech Acts
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