Page 424 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

Pragmatics and Speech Act Theory
I promise to go there tomorow. (3)
Here the primary illocution, corresponding to step four in the previous analysis, is (slightly simplified): 'S3 is saying that S3 promises to go there tomorrow.' This is not the illocutionary point of (3), however.S3is using this primary illocution as a vehicle for a further illocution to be read off the performative verb; namely, S3 reflexively-intends the (primary) statement to be a reason for H3 to believe that S3 undertakes and intends (i.e., promises) to go there tomorrow. There is no further inference to draw, so this is the illo- cutionary point of (3). By definition, then, the per- formative clause in (3) communicates an indirect illocution.
What additional evidence is there that per- formatives are statements? First, there is the obvious similarity between (3) and (4):
I promised to go there tomorrow. (4)
Unlike (3), which is in the present (nonpast) tense and has the illocutionary point of a promise, (4) is past tense and has the illocutionary point of a statement about a promise made (in the past). The primary illo- cution of (4) is 'S4 is saying that S4 promised to go there tomorrow.' This is not the only parallel with (3), because H4 will interpret this as follows: S4 reflexively- intends the (primary) statement to be a reason for H4 to believe that S4 did undertake and intend (i.e., promised) to go there tomorrow. There is no further inference to draw, so this is the illocutionary point of (4). Note that the undertaking in both (3) and (4) remains to be fulfilled, and while S4 is not actually making the promise in (4) as S3 is in (3), nevertheless, provided all normal felicity conditions hold, S4 is as much obliged to fulfill the promise reported in (4) as S3 is in (3). The presumption that the primary illo- cution of explicit performatives is that of a statement permits a commonsensical account of the similarity and difference between (3) and (4).
Second, there is a distinction between saying £ and saying that Z: the former reports locutions, the latter reports statements. Imperatives and interrogatives do not make statements. Compare (5):
I said the beer's cold.
I said that the beer's cold.
I said I promise to go there tomorrow.
I said that I promise to go there tomorrow.
Go!
I said go.
*I said that go.
I said that you must
go.
What's your name? (5) I said what's your name?
*I said that what's your name? I said that I want to knowyour
name.
Third, there is a set of adverbials which modify primary illocutionary acts, e.g., honestly, for the last time, seriously, frankly, once and for all, in the first place, in conclusion (see Allan 1986). Consider (7):
In the first place I admit to being wrong; (7) and secondly I promise it will never happen again.
Example (7) can be glossed: 'The first thing I have to say is that I admit to being wrong; and the second thing I have to say is that I promise it will never happen again.' It is clear that secondly denotes a second act of stating, not a second act of promising; from which it may be deduced that In the first place identifies a first act of stating, not a first act of admit- ting. There is no space to consider more than these three arguments; but the evidence is strongly against the view that explicit performatives are direct ( = pri- mary) illocutions, because primary illocutions are read off the clause-type.
Now consider (8):
Can you open the window? (8)
Depending on tone of voice and the context of utter- ance, the locution in (8) could be a question about the openability of the window, about H's ability to open the window, or a request to have H open the window. The primary illocution of (8) is'S is asking H whether or not H can open the contextually identifiedwindow, either right now or in the immediate future.' The next step is for H to relate the primary illocution to the context of utterance in order to determine S's apparent purpose in asking H whether or not H can open the window. Sa could be asking whether or not Ha is capable of opening the window. Perhaps if H, had sustained some possibly incapacitating injury, S. might be asking about H.'s strength; but (8) would be an unusually oblique way to ask about someone's physical condition. Imagine another context, Cb: the weather is so delightful and the room so stuffy that St, presumes Hb would surely have opened the window if it wereopenable; or perhaps the windowisperceptibly screwed shut; in either case the question focuses on the openability of the window rather than presupposing it. Again, suppose Sc is visiting H,. in He's apartment; it is a sunny spring day and the heating is on: Sc has
just walked up three flights of stairs wearing outdoor clothing and has remarked wryly how warm it is in the apartment. In Cc it is most likely that Sc is pre- supposing (a) the openability of the window and (b) H's capability of opening it, so that the illocutionary point of (8) is to get Hc to open the window. Sc, who is a guest, has pointedly remarked on the closeness of
In order to be reported by saying that, the prep- ositional content of imperatives and interrogatives needs to be recast as a statement; this is not the case with a performative because its primary illocution is that of a statement, for example, (6):
The beer's cold. I promise to go there (6) tomorrow.
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