Page 471 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

(k) Not all illocutionary verbs are performative verbs, for example, boast and threatenare not. (1) Style of performing the illocutionary act: for example, the difference between announcing
and confiding.
To these can be added another:
(m) differences in the criteria that H will bring in evaluating a speech act, for example, judging whether or not a statement is credible;judging invitationals in terms of whether S really wants A to be done and, if so, whether H is both able and willing to do A.
Searle uses only four criteria to establish five classes of speech acts: representatives (called 'assertives' in Searle 1979), directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations. The first criterion is illocutionary point ((a) above):
If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to classify uses of language, then there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language; we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes, and we bring about changes through our utterances. Often we do more than one of these at once in the same utterance.
(Searle 1975:369)
In addition, he uses: (b) direction of fit; (c) S's psycho- logical state; and (h) prepositional content.
Representatives/assertives have a truth value, show words-to-world fit, and express S's belief that/?. Direc- tives are attempts to get H to do something, therefore they show world-to-words fit, and express S's wish or desire that H do A. Commissives commit S to some future course of action, so they show world-to-words fit, and S expresses the intention that S do A. Expres- sives express S's attitude to a certain state of affairs specified (if at all) in the prepositional content (e.g., the underlined portion of / apologize for stepping on your toe). There is no direction of fit; a variety of different psychological states; and prepositional con- tent 'must... be related to S or H' (1975:357f.). Dec- larations bring about correspondence between the prepositional content and the world, thus direction of fit is both words-to-world and world-to-words. Searle recognizes no psychological state for declarations.
Bach and Harnish (1979:42-51, 11Of.) employ all of Searle's criteria except direction of fit, giving pre- dominant emphasis to S's psychological state—which they refer to as S's 'attitude.' They identify six classes: constatives express a belief, together with the intention that H form (or continue to hold) a like belief; direc- tives express S's attitude toward some act that H should carry out; commissives express S's undertaking to do A; acknowledgments ( = Searle's 'expressives') express, perfunctorily if not genuinely, certain feelings toward the hearer. Searle's 'declarations' are all 'con- ventional illocutionary acts' in Bach and Harnish, but split into effectives, which effect changes in insti-
tutional states of affairs, and verdictives, which have official binding import in the context of the institution for which they are made.
Searle's 'declarations' and Bach and Harnish's 'con- ventional illocutionary acts' are different from the other classes of acts—assertives, directives, commiss- ives, expressives—which are interpersonal. Inter- personal acts are typically directed at individuals. To take effect, they require H to react to S's illocution— mere understanding of the illocutionary point is insufficient: it is pointless for S to tell H it is raining, warn H of danger, or offer H condolences, if H fails to react appropriately to what S says. Declarations, on the other hand, are typically broadcast within a social group, and rely for their success on S being sanctioned by the community, institution, committee, or even a single person within the group to perform such acts under stipulated conditions; H's reaction as an individual is irrelevant to the effectiveness of being baptized, disqualified from driving, fired, or any other declaration, provided that the stipulated conditions are met. It is the reaction of the group which sanctions S that is significant for declarations. Compare the interpersonal 'opine that p' (e.g., I think history is bunk) with the declaration 'declare the verdict/?' (e.g., S, umpiring a game at the US Open Tennis Tour- nament, declares the ball Out!).
opine, assertive = interpersonal
(cf. Allan 1986: 194; Edmondsonl981:145f.)
<description> (preparatory condition)
(illocutionary intention)
S opines that p.
S believes there is sufficient evidence to express a (perhaps hedged) belief that p. S reflexively intends that U be a reason for H to believe that S holds (and can
justify) the opinion that p (and perhaps that H come to hold the opinion that p).
Speech Act Classification
declare a verdict, declaration (cf. Allan 1986: 203; Wierzbicka 1987:349)
(description) (preparatory condition)
(illocutionary intention)
S declares the verdict p.
Members of group G are sanctioned to declare verdicts on a set of topics T in a set of situations K; and (a) S believes there is sufficient evidence to support the opinion that p; (b) S is a member of G; (c) at the time of uttering U, S is of sound mind; (d) the verdict that p is on a topic which is a member of T; (e) the situation of utterance is a member of K.
S reflexively intends H to recognize that U declares the verdict p. (H is a member of the wider community of which G forms a proper part.)
Because declarations rely for their success on S being sanctioned by the community, etc., it may be necessary to safeguard society's interest with an executive con- dition which requires some watchdog other than S to ensure that clauses (b-e) of the preparatory condition hold.
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