Page 472 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

Pragmatics and Speech Act Theory
Speech acts can be grouped into four classes if H's evaluations are used as criteria. Statements (including denials, reports, predictions, promises, and offers) can all be judged in terms of the question 'Is p credible?' These are principally expressions of S's belief about the way the world was, is, or will be, and are most typically formulated with a declarative clause. Invi- tationals are a proper subset of Searle's directives, and include requests, exhortations, suggestions, warnings, etc. They have acceptability values: 'Does S really want A to be done and, if so, is H both able and willing to do it?' These principally invite H's par- ticipation, and many are formulated in an inter- rogative clause. Authoritatives include the rest of Searle's 'directives' and his 'declarations' (i.e., com- mands, permissions, legal judgments, baptisms, etc.), for which H must consider the question 'Does Shave the authority to utter U in the given context?' These principally have S 'laying down the law'; many of them are formulated in an imperative clause, the rest in a declarative. Expressives (greetings, thanks, apolo- gies, congratulations, etc.) have social-interactive appropriateness values: 'Has something occurred which warrants S expressing such a reaction to it?' These principally express social interaction with H;
many are idiomatic, the rest are in the default declara- tive clause format.
It is notable that all classes of speech acts can be conveyed using a declarative clause; but interrogatives typically indicate invitationals, imperatives auth- oritatives, and idiomsexpressives.
2. Comparing Definitions of niocutionary Forces
There is great similarity in the speech act definitions of Searle (1969), Bach and Harnish (1979), Edmondson (1981), Levinson (1983), Allan (1986), and Wierzbicka (1987), despite the different perspectives of these scholars. To identify the critical components of a
definition, six definitions of assertives are reviewed here. For easy comparison, clauses in the definitions of the different scholars which serve similar functions are identified by a common label.
assert, state (that), affirm (Searle 1969:67). Given the conditions described, Searle says that the utterance of/? constitutes an assertion, statement, or affirmation (on the distinctive characteristics of each, see Wierzbicka
1987:321,329,323).
Table 1. A comparison of five classifications of illocutionary types.
Austin Expositives Commissives Behabitives
Exercitives
V erdictives
Vendler Expositives Commissives Behabitives Interrogatives Exercitives Verdictives Operatives
Searle Assertives Commissives Expressives
Directives
Declarations
Bach & Harnish Assertives Commissives Acknowledgments
Directives Verdictives Effectives
Allan Statements
Expressives Invitationals
Authoritatives
450
(prepositional content)
(preparatory condition)
(sincerity condition)
(illocutionary intention)
p. [Searle's 'prepositional content' is the complement of the speech act verb and excludes its meaning—unlike the (description) ascribed to other scholars.]
(a) S has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of p.
(b) ItisnotobvioustobothSandH that H knows (does not need to be reminded of, etc.) p.
S believes p.
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an actual state of affairs. [Searle's term for this is 'essential condition.']
assertives (Bach and Harnish 1979:42)
(description)
(preparatory condition) (illocutionary
In uttering U, S asserts that p if S expresses
(a) thebeliefthatp,and
(b) the intention that H believe that p.
intention)
By 'intention,' they mean a 'reflexive-intention'.
claim(Edmondson 1981:145)
(preparatory condition)
(a)
SwishesHtobelievethatSbelieves [that p; that is] the information contained in the locution by means of which the claim is made is true, In making a claim, S may be held to believe that S's doing so is in the
(illocutionary (b) intention)