Page 684 - Krugmans Economics for AP Text Book_Neat
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Recent history tells us they will engage in a price war by slashing
                                                      ticket prices. If American Airlines were to try to maintain a price of
                                                      $800, it would soon find itself undercut by British Airways, which
                                                      would charge $750 and steal its customers. In turn, American Air-
                                                      lines would undercut British Airways by charging $700—and so on.
                                                      As long as each firm finds that it can capture the customers by cut-
                                                      ting price, each will continue cutting until price is equal to marginal
        Sean Callinan/Rob Homer                       This is the outcome Bertrand predicted.
                                                      cost. (Going any lower would cause them to incur an avoidable loss.)
                                                         Oligopolists would, understandably, prefer to avoid Bertrand behav-
                                                      ior because it earns them zero profits. Lacking an environment that im-
                                                      poses constraints on their output capacity, firms try other means of
        In the absence of collusion, price compe-  avoiding direct price competition—such as producing products that are not perfect substi-
        tition among oligopolists can be intense,
        as with the airfare war between Jetstar  tutes but are instead differentiated. We’ll examine this strategy in more detail in Module
        and Virgin Blue that has led to $300  68. For now, we note that producing differentiated products allows oligopolists to culti-
        fares to Bali.                 vate a loyal set of customers and to charge prices higher than marginal cost.
                                          Collusion is another approach to dodging the profit-suppressing effects of competi-
                                       tion. In the next module, we’ll see why informal collusion often works but sometimes fails.


         fyi




         The Great Vitamin Conspiracy
         It was a bitter pill to swallow. In the late 1990s,  the private homes of executives—to set prices  How could it have happened?
         some of the world’s largest drug companies  and divide up markets for “bulk” vitamins (like  The main answer probably lies in different na-
         (mainly European and Japanese) agreed to pay  vitamin A, vitamin C, and so on). These bulk vi-  tional traditions about how to treat oligopolists.
         billions of dollars in damages to customers after  tamins are sold mainly to other companies,  The United States has a long tradition of taking
         being convicted of a huge conspiracy to rig the  such as animal feed makers, food producers,  tough legal action against price-fixing. European
         world vitamin market.             and so on, which include them in their products.  governments, however, have historically been
          The conspiracy began in 1989 when the  Indeed, it was the animal feed companies that  much less stringent. Indeed, in the past some
         Swiss company Roche and the German com-  grew suspicious about the prices they were  European governments have actually encour-
         pany BASF began secret talks about raising  being charged, which led to a series of investi-  aged major companies to form cartels. But
         prices for vitamins. Soon a French company,  gations. The case eventually broke open when  European antitrust law has changed recently to
         Rhone-Poulenc, joined in, followed by several  Rhone-Poulenc made a deal with U.S. officials  become more like U.S. antitrust law. Despite
         Japanese companies and other companies  to provide evidence of the conspiracy. The  this change, however, the cultural tradition of
         around the world. The members of the group,  French company was concerned that rumors  forming cartels as normal business practice
         which referred to itself as “Vitamins, Inc.,” met  about price-fixing would lead U.S. officials to  lingers within the boardrooms of some European
         regularly—sometimes at hotels, sometimes at  block its planned merger with another company.  companies.







          Module 64 AP Review

        Solutions appear at the back of the book.
        Check Your Understanding
        1. Explain whether each of the following characteristics will  b. The firm has a cost advantage over its rivals.
           increase or decrease the likelihood that a firm will collude with  c. The firm’s customers face additional costs when they switch
           other firms in an oligopoly to restrict output.        from one firm’s product to another firm’s product.
           a. The firm’s initial market share is small. (Hint: Think about  d. The firm and its rivals are currently operating at maximum
             the price effect.)                                   production capacity, which cannot be altered in the short run.

        642   section 12      Market Structures: Imperfect Competition
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