Page 330 - UAE Truncal States
P. 330
The External Influences
This phase of the dispute was brought to a sudden end when, with
the full backing of the British Government, the forces of the Sultan of
Muscat and Oman and those of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, supported by
the Trucial Oman Levies,75 moved into the oasis on the morning of
26 October 1955 and forced the bloodless surrender of the Saudi
detachment. The British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, ex
plained his Government’s reasons for this action to the House of
Commons that same day.70 The Riyadh Line,77 as amended in 1937,
was unilaterally declared the frontier between Abu Dhabi and Saudi
Arabia. This fail accompli laid the entire issue to rest only for as long
as the British Government remained formally and legally the
spokesman for the emirate of Abu Dhabi. The question of the frontier
between the two Slates came up again as a major factor while the
support of Saudi Arabia was being sought for the new federation,
which was being created in the wake of the British abrogation of the
treaties with all the Trucial States in 1971.78
The surprisingly firm line adopted rather abruptly by the British
Government in October 1955, after years of half-hearted diplomatic
defence of what she nevertheless regarded as the indisputable rights
of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Oman, marked the end of an
era. For over a century from the 1820s, Great Britain had gradually
extended its influence over the coastal Rulers of the Gulf while
taking elaborate precautions against getting involved in their affairs
in the hinterland. From the 1920s this stance, reiterated innumerable
times in the correspondence between the British administrators in
India and in the Gulf, was thrown to the winds to defend the
territorial extent of the oil concessions. From this lime on the coastal
Rulers who had signed concessionary agreements were supported in
their efforts to assert their sovereignty over the tribes of the
hinterland.
When the concession-holder, PD (TC), was able to start ex
ploration for oil after the Second World War, these concessions soon
took on a real commercial meaning and value. Protecting the interest
of the London-based consortium of oil companies was seen by the
British Government to be its duty even if this meant abandoning the
long-standing policy of strict non-involvement in the internal affairs
and in the hinterland of the Trucial States. The so-called Buraimi
Dispute became eventually the turning point where, at first hesi
tantly, but eventually using even military force, Britain fully adopted
this change in policy.
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