Page 423 - UAE Truncal States

Chapter Nine

therefore implied possible acceptance of diplomatic relations with
communist countries, was clarified, and it transpired that the aim
was harmony with its like-minded neighbours. A different position
favoured by any of its members would have been incompatible with
the UAE’s conservative inclinations. An important decision taken in
this context was that the guerilla war in neighbouring Oman’s
southern province of Dhufar was eventually recognised by all the
authorities in the UAE as a possible threat to its own security, and
the willingness to co-operate more closely among themselves,
including in security matters and immigration procedures, promptly
followed suit.
The October War of 1973 was a milestone in a great many respects
for the self-understanding of all Arab and most Muslim communities.
Within the UAE, loo, this event engendered a universal consensus
endorsing large-scale involvement of the UAE in the common Arab
concern. Those who shape the country’s foreign policy know they
have the assurance that the priorities set by them are universally
accepted in the UAE. The October War was a catalyst for the process
of rapidly sharpening awareness of a number of issues which are
vital for the UAE’s prosperity, such as the management of the oil
reserves, the need to invest surplus money for the future, indus­
trialisation at home, the role to be assumed in what became known as
‘‘recycling the petrodollar”, the obligation to assist Third World
countries, and last but not least the possible involvement of the
State’s army in the Arab cause.103
The revolution in Iran in 1978/79, causing instability in that
country, was probably the most important outside event to evoke
reactions inside the UAE. This, compounded with the impact of
the American/Egyptian/Israeli Camp David agreement, if anything
served only to strengthen the Federation.
The crisis of the American hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan brought the possibility of a clash of the super-powers
in the Gulf area very close. It might be speculated that the members of
the UAE might disagree among themselves over the position which
the State should adopt towards the super-powers, in particular if
America were to offer military protection to the vulnerable oil
producers, an offer to which all in the Gulf would vehemently object.
But if the Arab and international setting in the area remains stable,
the debate about the impact of outside events on the stability of the
Federation reduces to the question of how well the federal system of

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