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RESIDENCY AND MUSCAT POLITICAL AGENCY FOR IS3-W5.

found himself unable to carry out, as Shchab-ul-Din was too vigilant and well guarded, until
the arrival of Jorge D'Albuquerqae, who, being cn his way out from Lisbon with a fleet of ten
ships, bad received instructions at Mozambique from the Viceroy to meet him at Muscat, and who
at this juncture put in at Kilhat. A stratagem devised by Duarte Mendcs was agreed to by
Albuquerque, and a small force having been landed in the town, the Governor's house was
attacked in the night. Tire plan, however, failed. The Portuguese werc|repulsed by the Persian*
and overpowered, and the house in which they took refuge was set on fire. After a severe
struggle and heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, they were rescued by a fresh party
from tbc fleet. Shebab-ul-Dfn remained uncapturcd and triumphant.
Shortly after, in the beginning of the following year, 1520, the Viceroy, Diago Lopes do
Siqueira, anchored at Muscat, and after an enquiry censured and condemned the whole proceed­
ings, and put Duarte Mcndea in irons. The Viceroy then proceeded on to Hormuz with a few
galleys, leaving Albuquerque in charge of the major portion of the fleet at Muscat. Fifteen
Portuguese, who had been taken prisoners and carried inland from Kilhat, were recovered by
Albuquerque in wretched plight, but no attempt seems to have been made to avenge the disaster.
Iu the next year, only seven years after the fall of Hormuz and the death of tbe great con­
quistador, a concerted insurrection took place at Hormuz and along the Arabian shores from
Bahrein to Kilhat, and the garrisons were taken so completely by surprise that it was only by
chance and by their own marvellous valour tbat’tbeir entire annihilation was not accomplished.
The cause of this revolt, according to the Portuguese officers on the spot, was the dissatisfaction
felt by the King at their interference in tbe arrangements of the Castoms House and general
supervision of tbe revenue, a measure lately introduced under orders from Lisbon. By this
control a number of favourites and parasites lost their sinecures, and a good deal of wasteful
expenditure and peculation was no doubt prevented. But tho proximate and predominating
cause was without question the greed, insolence, and oppression of the Portnguese officials,
who made no scruple of taking advantage of their strength and of helping themselves as they
pleased. The plan of the massacre was elaborately worked out aud decided upon by the King
and his ministers, and when all was ready, letters were despatched to the Persian Governors of
dependencies on the Arab coast with orders to rise against tbe Portuguese in their towns on
the appointed day and spare none. The rising was therefore general, and from its taking place
simultaneously, there was no opportunity of the Portuguese fleeiug from one point to another.
A stratagem was devised to get rid of the Portuguese armada constantly stationed at Hormuz
to support the Commandant. The King, pretcuding that the dependencies on the Oman coast
were beiDg ravaged by pirates, requested Dora Garcia to despatch the armada to protect them;
this was on the eve of the rising, and tbe Commandant unsuspectingly issued the necessary
orders to the Captain-Major, Manocl deSouza Tavares. The latter, however, took two only out
of the four ships at his disposal and set sail for Muscat. Tbe revolt occurred on the 30th Novem­
ber 1521, and commenced with an attack by the Shah Bandar on the two vessels left in the
harbour at midnight. The crews were overcome, and a fire signal having been lighted in board
the captured vessels, a massacre ensued of the Portuguese residents in the city, who were asleep on
their beds, unsuspicious of evil. About sixty Portuguese were slain and captured by tbe Persian
troops and populace, and the remainder took refuge in the fort, which was bravely defended by
the garrison until saccour arrived from India. In the dependencies the King’s plan was faith­
fully carried out by the Governors. At Bahrein the) Christians were attacked, and the factor
Buy Bale was tortured and crucified. At Sohar very few, if any, escaped the massacre that took
place. In Muscat alone the Portuguese found friends and protection. The attitude of the
Arab Governor, Sheikh R*«hid, who was favourably inclined to them and doubtless foresaw
their ultimate triumph, kept the Persians in check and prevented a rising; and when the chief
factor of Kilhat, Vas deVciga, arrived shortly after, he threw off his allegiance and declared for
the Portuguese, in which he was joined by the chief Arab inhabitant*. At Kilbat the
Portuguese appear to have received warning from the Commandant of Hormuz of the revolt
and, collecting their valuables, made a start for their boats iu the harbour, hut they were inter­
cepted by the Governor and the Persian garrison, who attacked and killed several and captured
other*. The factor, T. Va* deVeiga, thon sot out for Muscat, where be found Captain-Major
Manod.dcSouza Tavares,%with whom he sailed at once for the relief of Hormuz.
At Hormuz, immediately on the occurrence of the revolt, the Commandant had hired a
vessel which ho entrusted to JoaC dcMeira, and directed him to sail at once to India with
the news for the Viceroy, and to touch at Muscat and Kilhat on the way. This JoaS deMeira
aid, and was thus instrumental in warning his countrymen at those two placet of the intended
massacre. Tho number of Portuguese killed in this insurrectionary movement was about 120,
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