Page 496 - PERSIAN 2B 1883_1890_Neat
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28          ADMINISTRATION REPORT OP THE PERSIAN GULP POLITICAL

                   ordorstoEl Bahrein, Koweit, and Has El Khyma to fit out their fleets to scour the Gulf against
                   'Omani commerce. To these orders the Uttoobees and Kowaeim demurred, as the pearl fishery
                   season wan now commencing, aud all their men wero engaged, and they accordingly represented
                   to the Amir that they could not abandon their occupation, but tho commands wore repeated in
                   •o peremptory a manner that the tribes no longer hesitated to obey, and tho pearl fishery that
                   year was  abandoned in favour of piraoy. The nows of tho Amir's intention to extend his
                   aggressions by sea, as well as by laud, induced tho Persian Government and the Pasha of
                   Baghdad to ally themselves with Scyyid 8ultan against him. In the naval war that followed
                   Seyyid Sultan personally took an n ctive part, and did his utmost to protect his own coasts and
                   commerce from the insults and ravages of tho piratical fleet; but hia success was not great.
                   His allies had, after some show of assistance, left him in the lurch, and ho was now threatened
                   with an invasion by land.
                       In this critical position, Seyyid Sultan deemed it best to try and propitiate bis enemy.
                   He accordingly despatched a mission to Derayeh, and purchased a truce for three years by the
                   payment of a largo sum of money, the promise of a yearly tribute of 12,000 dollars, and the
                   establishment of a Wahhabeo Agent at Muscat. The Amir, however, had no intention of
                   relinquishing his grasp on 'Oman, even on these humiliating terms; He took advantage of
                   the truce to re-inforce El Harik at El Bereymi, and, shortly after, perfidiously broke it- by
                   ordering his General to march. El Harik at once poured down into the Batineh, where he
                   committed unspeakable atrocities, and easily overpowered the resistance he met with from the
                   disunited tribes in his path.
                       Seyyid Sultan, on hearing of El Harik's movement, hastily gathered as large a force as
                   he could muster, and a battle took place in Wady Heimali above Soweyk, in which the Omanis
                   were routed by the Wahhabees. This was the first great disaster experienced in 'Oman at the
                   hands of these fanatics, and Seyyid Sultan was constrained by the alarm felt everywhere to call
                   a council of war at Barka to discuss a plan of operations. The Shaikhs of tribes of both
                   actions assembled there agreed to combine against the common enemy, and it was arranged
                   that each tribe should contribute its quota and assemble at Kbabooreh on a certain day.
                       El Harik after, the affair at Heima!;, retired towards Sobar, to which he laid siege, and
                   (here quietly awaited the advance of the army o£ defence Scyyid Sultan was raising, and which
                   soon numbered 12,000 men.
                       At this juncture the news of the death of the Wahbabee's Amir Abdul Aziz, who had been
                   assassinated at Derayeh in October, reached El Harik at Sohar, and the ad rices he then
                   received of affairs at home induced him to raise the siege and retire without delay to El
                   Bereymi. Relieved from the pressure of their exacting masters, the Kowasim speedily made
                   peace with Seyyid Sultan, and the 'Omanis, unacquainted with the real cause of the sudden dis­
                   appearance of their foes, ascribed it to their own superiority in numbers or to the success of the
                   negociation8 that had been carried on by Seyyid Saltan with El Harik.
                       "When the death of the Emperor Paul dissolved the treaty for the joint Franco-Russian
                   invasion of India overland, Napoleon determined that the substitution of French supremacy for
                   English in India should follow as a natural consequence upon the sabjection of England itself,
                   for which purpose he at once began to make preparation. With this grand scheme before him
                   Napoleon, towards the close of the year 1802, while the treaty of Amiens was yet in force,
                   selected one of his ablest Generals, Decaen, to be the Captain General of tho French possessions
                   in the East, and despatched him with Admiral Linoi's expedition, which sailed from Brest on the
                   6th March 1803.
                       The mission of General Decaen was to observe closely the position of the English in India
                   in their relation to the Native Princes, and to prepare the way for the French conquest and
                   occupation of India by procuring full information as to the state of affairs and extent of
                   armament required. After visiting Pondichery, General Decaen fixed upon the'Island of
                   Mauritius as his head-quarters and post of observation, and on establishing himself there
                   immediately despatched M. de Cavaignac in the Atalanta frigate to his destination.
                       This M. de Cavaignac had been appointed by Napoleon Agent and Consul for France
                    at Muscat, and as his mission had the same object in view as that of General Decaen, to whom
                    he was subordinate, it may be as well to transcribe here the concluding paragraph of the long
                    letter of instructions written for the General's guidance by Napoleon, which indicates clearly
                    enough that the scheme for the cooqnest of India had not been relinquished, and that Decaen
                    might possibly be entrusted with the enterprise—
                       *The minion of the Captain General ie, in the first initanoo, a mission of obsemtion, political and
                    nsfitary, &o., but tho fint Consol, well informed by the Captain General, upon whom he .thee for the punctual
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