Page 619 - PERSIAN 2B 1883_1890_Neat

RESIDENCY AND MUSCAT POLITICAL AGENCY POR 1883-90. 25

to deal with the enemy, who kept on retreating as the other party advanced.
The development of this new feature in Omanco tactics was not calculated
upon by the advancing party who had to carry on the pursuit till the enemy
found himself within the friendly precincts of Rustak.
As it seemed pretty certain now that although Seyyid Ibrahim had given
a friendly refuge to 8eyyid Abdul Aziz and bis followers at Eustak, he bad no
intention of co-operating with him or of giving him any active support, and
accordingly as no reason remained for maintaining such a large force to watch
any further development of Seyyid Abdul Aziz’s scheme, the 8ultan wisely
paid off and dismissed most of the men and directed his brother to leave Jimmeh
where he was encamped and to fall hack upon Burkch whence he could as
easly watch the enemy’s movements.
For the next few weeks the situation remained unaltered, and, although
various rumours were in circulation, nothing beyond a few intertribal raids,
mainly incidental on the disturbed condition of the country then existing,
occurred. About the beginning of February the Rahabiyin attacked a Hinawi
caravan consisting of men and property belonging to the Yal-Wahlbeh, the
Hah us and the Duekeh, in retaliation for the raid committed on them by
Hamud-al-Jahafi on his first advance to the Batineh. In this encounter the
Rahabiyin succeeded in killing six men and in carrying off 4,0 camels. This
incident might have led to serious complications, had not His Highness the
Sultan succeeded in time to effect a truce between the parties.
\7hen Sheikh Hamud-al-Jahafi first visited Rnstak, it was more than
surmised that he had succeeded in winning Sayid Ibrahim over to the cause,
and as under those circumstances in all probability, the latter would have first
attacked Sohar or any other Batineh Ports, it was necessary to reinforce the
garrisons in all these places. The Wali of Sohar, Sayid Ha mud Bin Nasir, in­
vited the Naim to hiB assistance, but by the time they could arrive Sayid
Abdul Aziz and Sheikh Hamud were gradually retreating towards Rustak,
aod it was apparent that Sayid Ibrahim had no intention of attempting to at­
tack Sohar or any other place. The Wali, Sayid Hamud, finding himself now
freer to act-, led the new reinforcements to Wadi Kasim with the object of co­ 1
1
operating with Sayid Fahad with whose party he was eventually ordered to
fall back upon Burkch. The Naim, however, rather suddenly left that place
and found back their way to Sohar, plundering the Yal-Saad on the way and
committing raids near Sohar itself for which reason Sayid Hamud had to be
sent by sea to quiet and dismiss them.
After the retreat of Sayid Abdul Aziz and Sheikh Hamud from the
Batineh, the former remained at Rustak till about the end of March, when he
left for the Shamal or the Pirate Coast with the object of visiting Sheikh Zaid-
bin-Khalifeh at Abu-DabL Sheikh Hamud, however, not contented with the
share of plunder which had already fallen, to his lot in the Batineh, occu­ r'
pied himsdf with his usual pursuit of raiding until being deserted by most of
hia followers and unable to retrace his steps to the Sharkiyyeh in safety with­
out an escort, on Sayid Abdul Aziz’s departure for the Shamal, tendered his i
submission to Sayid Badr-bin-Seif who was left in charge at Burkeh after •I
Sayid Fahad’s return to Muscat. His Highness the Sultan deeming it advis­
able to accept it allowed him to return to the Sharkiyyeh in the company of a
Gafri Chief. i
.
Thus the close of the official year under report saw another effort of Sayid 1
Abdul Aziz's to incite the people of Oman to revolt against the present Sal­
tan and to accept him as their ruler instead, and, like its predecessors, in frus­
tration, a result which, while it dearly indicates the weakness of hi* own causa.

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