Page 390 - Truncal States to UAE_Neat

The Formal ion of l ho Federation
Zahedi insisted that it was a matter to be decided between Britain
and Iran alone, and threatened that Iran would oppose the federation
of Arab Emirates if this question were not settled to Iran’s satis­
faction. The Shah as well as Prime Minister Hoveida repeated that
Iran would use force if necessary.
Anxious to resolve this problem, which the respective shaikhdoms
were not expected to negotiate themselves,100 Britain engaged in an
intensive dialogue with Iran, and Sir William Luce never missed out
Teheran on his frequent visits to the Gulf. He presented various
British compromise proposals to the Iranian government, Sharjah
and Ra’s al Khaimah, as well as some other members of the projected
federation. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home,
frequently consulted with the Iranian Ambassador to Britain, Amir
Afshar. The British government maintained, without being explicit,
that the islands belonged to the Arab shaikhdoms, but in the face of
Iranian intransigence, Britain eventually sought to soften the impact
of the Iranian blow and negotiated certain conditions for condoning
a compromise. Both Britain and the Ruler of Sharjah, in the interests
of stability in the Gulf, resigned themselves to the fact that Iran’s
determination to have a military presence on Abu Musa could not
be ignored.
The Ruler of Sharjah, the late Shaikh Khalid bin Muhammad, took
an active part in the search for a solution, visiting Iran in early 1970
and agreeing to set up a joint committee, which, however, did not
materialise.107 Instead Iran’s conditions were conveyed to Shaikh
Khalid by Sir William Luce. These conditions were unacceptable to
Sharjah mainly because sovereignty over the island was to fall to
Iran after two years; the only positive aspect of the deal was Iran’s
offer of economic aid to Sharjah.
To demonstrate to Arab governments the extent of the Iranian
claim and the reality of the threat on the one side, and his own
inability to deal with this situation alone, Shaikh Khalid sent, on 23
August 1971, a lengthy memorandum to a number of Arab States in
which the history of Abu Musa's connection with Sharjah is
chronicled and the steps in the negotiations are described. The text of
the memorandum culminated in an appeal to the Arab States for
support in at least averting loss of sovereignty: “Sharjah appreciates
that it is not appropriate at this stage to request its Arab brothers to
use force against Iran to prevent it from occupying the island.
However, we hope that all the Arab States will support us in our
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