Page 367 - Records of Bahrain (3) (ii)_Neat

Reforms and unrest, 1923
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excited tbc Nmdis and. I had to Order him to go into hi., office and romVun there,
an order which ho resented, but for the moment obeyed. He teffppeared later fn-
the eamc.Btate of cfccitomont and I again had to severely warn lura'. ^
I remained in tho bazaar until all was quiet, and sovcral shop's had re-opened’
On my roturn to the Agency I was visited by Simile Hamad bin Easa who-had come1
to consult me ns to the measures to be adopted. It was agreed to have a meeting
that evening to which the rival lenders Were to be asked, with a view to easing the
situation. While nil concerned were waiting for Shaik JInmad in the evening
(lie had been delayed bytho tide) Qosuibi suddenly left the Agency petulantly an3
said he would not attend the meeting. He was followed and brought back by
Yusuf Kanoo. At the meeting which followed our efforts were frustrated by
Qosnibi who was unreasonably excited and instead of discussing measures to
prevent disturbances, kept up a tirade against the Persians. I warned both
leaders that I would hold them personally responsible in the event of a further
outbreak. As Qosnibi particularly uccuscd the town watchmen, who aro mainly
Persians, 1 decided with Slmik Hamad’s consent, that it would be better for them (o’
bo deprived of their shot guns, lest they served as an excuse to the Najdis to re--
open the quarrel. In any ease they could not control the situation arid would
hardly be unbiased. Slmik Hamad ordered them to lodge their guns in the Agency.
In spile of the accusation of Qosnibi, however, no ease of shot gUn wound has been
discovered and I do not think the police used their guns at all in tho disturbance.
Had they done so it might perhaps not have occurred on so large a scale.
n Later, ovents occurred which are described by Mr. Mactfic in his statement. I
The following morning (11th) T passed through the bazaars and all was quiet.
should here like to mention that his prompt handling of the situation which arose
undoubtedly prevented a further outbreak. On receiving news of these occurrences
■/k. I again went to the bazaar and found Mr. Mac/ic had controlled the situation.
1 found Shaik Solman at the Customs surrounded by fidawis who had done nothing,
lie asked me for advice and I accompanied him* through the bazaar to instruct
fidawis and to assist to disperse the crowd. I enquired of Qosaibi the causo of
disturbances before my arrival. He declared that the Persians had been, and still
were, collected in certain Khans, heavily armed. Slmik Selman and I, taking
Qosaibi with us, visited these Khans. We found no gatherings and no arms. I
then visited Qosaibi’s’premises where there were a number of Najdis armed with-
lathis, I had them sent away. His private house contained about 115 Najdis
armed with rifles and swords. These, he explained, were messengers, etc., from
Bin Saud who were guests in his house and had not quitted it# On my return to tho
Agency I learned that a disturbance was in progress at Muharraq, and that Najdis
wero “ Hawasing " in front of the houses of .Shaikhs Eas'a and Hamad. Tho
Shaik had ordered that no boats be allowed to leave Muharraq forManameh, but-
could not control the Najdis who seized boats. At about noon five large boats
crowded with Najdis, all armed and many with magazine rifles, were observed
coming from Muharraq. 1 sent to Simile Selman to take steps to stop them
lauding. Meanwhile instead of proceeding to the Customs pier the boats drew in
ut the Agency. The occupants carried flags and were “ Hawasing ” and firing
rifles. As their intentions were not clear, I fell in the detachment, out of their
Bight. They were disembarking, when Qosnibi, who had been sent by Shaik
Selman to. dissuade them, arrived. He argued for some time but appeared unable
to control them and they were pressing past him to the shore. Realizing that tho
result of their landing in the Persian residential quarter and the fact that thero were
Persians in the Agency, might be serious, I ordered tho detachment to take up a
position conspicuously along the sea wall of the Agency and sent a messago to
Qosaibi, drawing his attention to tho fact that the soldiors wore prepared and that
I would take action if they landed within Agency limits. As was anticipated this
brought them to their senses and they ro-embarked for Muharraq Meanwhilo
two other boat-loads from Hidd had landed near the Wireless. I ordered Qosaibi,
who was by this time genuinely alarmed at tho Najdis being out of his offontivo
control, to take immediate steps to turn thorn back which, with tho example of the
other boats returning to Muharraq, ho was ablo to do. For tho remainder of the
day very wild rumours wero afloat and the situation was not improved by tho
Sunnis 6f Budiayck and Rafa seizing tho opportunity to mako an attack on tho
Shiah village of *Ali.