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Part I—Chop. IV.                11
           yoar continuing to not as Envoy from the Government of India and in that character
           oo-operatiag with Hie Majesty’s Envoy. If however you should find that measure incom­
           patible with a good understanding botweon yourself and Sir Harford Jones, or with the
           interests of tho public service, it will then bo necessary that you should refrain from the
           exoroiso of your diplomatic powers in Persia and should confine your character to that of
           Political Agent or Commissioner of the Governor-General of India. Government would in
           that event still havo tho benefit of your valuable advico afforded both to this Government and
           to Sir Harford Jonos, and it might bo expected that tho happy influence whioh you have
           established in Persia would bo efficaciously exerted in promoting the public interests in those
           countries.
              32.  If Sir Harford Jones should not bo accredited to the Pacha of Bagdad or to any
           other neighbouring States, you would bo at liberty to exorcise your diplomatic powers iu those
          countries. In tho opposito caso, you will still bo enabled to aot under the General Agenoy on
           the part of tho Governor-Genoral with which you are invested.
              33.  Tho delioaoy of your situation with regard to tho concurrent mission of Sir Harford
          Jonos is duly felt and appreciated by Government, but a confident hope and expectation is
           entertained that the difficulties and embarrassments of such a situation will be surmounted by
           your tempor and that any impression of discomforts or disgnst to which your personal
           feelings may be exposed by tho intervention of a separate authority, will bo effaced by tho
           superior sense of those important services which you are called upon to render to your country
           and to the world in a crisis of affairs more momentous than any that has ever yet required in
           this country, the exertion of individual magnanimity, ability, and publio zeal.
               28. The proceedings of General Malcolm at Maekat were reported to Secret and Poll.
           Lord Minto on the following despatch, dated 1st May 1808:—        No?237'oPisos,
              I sailed from Bombay on board His Majesty’s ship Psyche whioh had been appointed p* 7643‘
           by His Excellenoy Sir Edward Peile to convey me to tho Oulph on the 17th ultimo, and on
           the 30th I arrived at Muscat anchored in the offing, and sent a message to the Imaum
           through my Moonshee Mahomed Hussen, to acquaint him that I meant to remain only a few
           hours, and hoped ho would (considering tho precarious state of the season) excuse my not
           landing, and send one of his confidential officers to see me, as I had a communication to make,
           which I thought of some importance to his interests.
              2. The Imaum received the Moonshee in a very friendly manner, and sent one of his first
           and favourite officerp, Mahomed Gholoom, to hear what I had to state. I shall shortly report
           for Your Lordship’s information tho substance of my conference with Mahomed Gholoom,
           whom I was glad to see deputed on this occasion, as ho was an old particular acquaintance
           of mine and I knew him to be a sincere friend to the connection between the Muscat and
           English Governments.
              8. I shortly explained the nature of my mission to him, and the general causes whioh
           had occasioned it: though the British Government, I said, did not give much credit to the reports
           of the designs of the French, it was its principles to be always vigilant and it hastened to
           meet every danger that threatened to approaoh its dominions, as it knew such conduot would
           always keep its enemies at a distance. English Government, I told him, had acted on all
           occasions  towards the State of Muscat with singular moderation and generosity and had
           lately allowed it (rather than bring distress upon its trade) to maintain a friendly intercourse
           with the French. This indulgence, I informed him, there was no wish to withdraw unless
           circumstances required it, but that it was my duty to state to him, for the information
           of tho Imaum, the precise lino that Chief ought to adopt under every possible change: if he
           meant to preserve the favor of the British Government, he must   on no account, I stated,
           allow any French Agent to come to Muscat or to any other port of  his territories  nor permit
          any vessel, belonging to his port to convey a French subject from one place to another whether
           in India, the Red Sea, or the Gulph, and he should under no extremity, I added, allow the
           French to take possession of any port or island in the Gulph, or to land in any place that
           was occupied by the troops of his Government; and if an attempt  was made by  that  nation
           to seize any euoh port or island, the Imaum must give orders for   his troops to resist them
           to the last, and to aot on snoh an occasion in co-operation with the English should any of
           the vessels or troops of that State be in the vicinity, and not to hesitate to put the troops or
           vessels of the English Government in possession of any post they required for the purpose
           of effecting this object. Mahomed Gholoom here spoke of the neutrality which the Muscat
           State was so desirous to preserve. This I told him with some warmth was very well, if the
           French did not approach the Gulph, or the shores of India in any quarter where the Imaum
           could aid or oppose them; but in such an event if his master was not foaod to be a decided
           friend, he would most undoubtedly be treated as an enemy. It would be very strange, I added,
           if the Imaum oonsidered in an equal 'light a State to which he owed his prosperity and
           existence and one which possessed only the power to injure him by the casual capture of a few
           trading vessels belonging to his port.
                I further informed Mahomed Gholoom at this conference that I had instructions to
           obtain a written engagement from the Imaum by which he was to agree to admit us to the
           possession of such of his ports in the Gulph as we might eventually require to enable ns
           to resist any attempt of the French in that quarter, but’that I had not insisted upon this
           formal engagement becauso I did not wish by bo publio an aot to preoipitate a rupture
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