Page 159 - Historical Summaries (Persian Gulf) 1907-1953

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mcnt, l)iit Persia could not. give a definite Agree­
ment witli regard to a special point of her
territory, as such an Agreement might appear to
others like a consent to partition.”

On the 10th May, 1900, Lord Salisbury
addressed a despatch to Her Majesty’s Cliargd
d’AIVaires at Tehran, in which he wrote jis
follows:—
“ You should take utiy opportunity that limy offer
itself to explain that llor Majesty’s Government have
no desire to diminish, but rather seek to uphold and
confirm, the authority of the Persian Government iu
the southern provinces, and that it is in the interest of
Persia, as well as of Great Britain, that they endeavour
to prevent tho intrusion of other Powers.”

The annexed extracts from a despatch, dafed
July 1901, from His Majesty’s Miuistor at
Tehran, show in some detail how the question of
giving a British assuranco to tho Sheikh
arose:—
Sir A. Hardin ge *' The Sheikh is evidently nervous about the designs
No. 118, of tho Persian Government, and looks to us for
July 28, 1901.
assistance and protection.
“ If a Russian Consul-General should come to Bushiro
tho Sheikh may, should such support be withheld by
us, bo tempted to coquet with him, or ut any rate to
modify to some extent the friendly relations which ho
has hitherto cultivated with the British Resident ut
Busline.
“ It is undoubtedly important that ho should continue
to bo our friend and to be guided by our advioe, and I
am thcroforo uuxious to bo able to give him such
assurances of support as will prevent his looking for
help elsewhere.
“ I shall visit him in the course of the tour to the
Persian Gulf ports which J hope to undertake next
October, and 1 should bo grateful if your Lordship
would instruct me us to tho language which I should
hold to him in reply to tho questious which he will
almost certainly put to me in regard to possible diffi­
culties hctwcon himself and tho Persian Government,
“ My idon is that wo should endeavour to persuade
him to come to a fair arrangement with tho Persian
Customs, ns it is impossible that M. Naus, in reor­
ganizing that sorvieo, can allow so important a port as
Molmmmorah to remain boyond his control, but that wo
should, in view of possible Russian activity in Southern
Persiu, attach him to ourselves by a promise that wo
will not lot his political authority over his tribesmen be
destroyed or undermined by the Persian Government.
" I am fully uwavo of tho difficulty of supporting