Page 237 - PERSIAN 9 1941_1947

3,

Wood among their friends Information and ideas advantageous to
Allied cause, while public radio broadcasts did something to
fctok the flow of rumours coming from Axis sources.
|pAL 8ITUATT0N.
At the beginning of the year, the tribal problems of Pars
(po within tho scope of world war politics because of the decision
8-use the Bushiro-Isfahan road to transport aid to Russia, and a
W was made, though eventually abandoned, for the construction
f a subsidiary road through tribal territory from Parrashband.
Swas decided that energetic measures must be taken to restore
IS Iranian Government's authority in the province, eliminate the
ftfluonco of Naair Qashgai, apprehend the Gentians known to be
1th him, and maintain security on the main road, and General
Jiahbakhti was appointed to cayyy out this taBk. To assist him,
IttPORCB appointed a British Liaison Mission which was to provide
i:certain amount of transport, give advice, and report to the
Ifltish authorities on the situation as it developed.
8hahbakhti arrived at Shiraz on Pob. 2nd, and assumed his
UBOtions as General Officer Commanding the Southern Forces and
ievernor General of Fare, Prom the first, however, ho showed
ittle more promise of being able to deal with the situation than
is predecessor. The Iranian Govt • » Instead of giving him whole-
parted support, allowed several of the newspapers in Tehran and
jho deputy Naubakht, to espouse openly the oause of the .^ashgai,
it was an open secret that there was a strong body of opinion
b both the cabinet and the court which did not wish to force
fee issue* In these circumstances, not only did Shahbakhti delay
AC commencement of operations against the :;ashgai, but he did
ittle to prepare the way politically by settling the grievances
if other tribes (in particular the Mamassani), apart from invit-
jig Qawam ul Mulk to Shiraz to use his undoubted influence on
}*iy of the tribes opposed to the Qaahgai,
When, after getting a measure of support from Tehran, General
jhahbakhti did commence operations on May 22nd. he seems to have
jet about his business in the wrong way. Although he loudly
proclaimed that his object was chiefly to collect unllcenced aims,
(is plan of campaign was designed rather to concentrate on the
•peupation of the tribal headquarters of Piruzabad, in the hope
.that this suocess would demoralize his opponents,and that he
lould be able to disarm them later. No attempt was therefore
)Uds to interfere with the migration to the Garmsir, and General
jfcahbakhtl told H.M.Consul that he wanted as many gunmen as
possible to travel northwards ao as to weaken Nasir at Piruzabad.
After a dilatory campaign, in which the Govt. forces showed
little initiative, and the Qashgai, surprisingly, made no attempt
to Croats disorder In their rear by raiding the main road,
Mruzabad was occupied on June 11th, General Shahbakhti now
k*d the chance of putting into force his alleged polioy, and of
following up the trlbenmen before they could regroup find while
&fce moral effect of the occupation of their capital was still
irppennost in their minds. He did nothing, however, to exploit
•ala success, and it soon became apparent that the position of his
jinny with its numerous small garrisons which might be attackedin
.'detail by superior tribal forces, was not as strong rpj it seemed
[to be at first. It seems probable, therefore, that even with-
fout the disaster which soon followed, the Iranian Govt.would have
ifound that its authority in Pars was just as precarious as it
•fas at the beginning of the year,
• /
The effect of the Semirun incident on July 3rd •» when a mixed
Bind of Qashgai and Bolr nhmedi defeated and disarmed a garrison
If nearly one thousand rifles , was to bring about a state of
confusion and disorder worse than had been experienced since the
list war? while the highly exaggerated first reports, and the
Ibrlous inability of General Shahbakhti and his army to take
itrong measures, did even more to sap the morale of the Govt's
• • • •