Page 407 - UAE Truncal States

Chapter Nine

only Dh.6,015.1 million; actual expenditure was Dh.6,604 million; the
deficit of Dh.588.9 million was, however, easily covered by the
previous year’s surplus. Yet both, total revenues and total expendi­
ture, bore little relation to the originally projected budget figures of
Dh. 13,166.7 million.141
The 1979 budget figure was reduced to Dh.9,715.7 million in
response to the previous year’s low rate of implementation. Also,
because of the constitutional crisis of early 1979, the Council of
Ministers was not able until July to approve the budget, which was
by then based on the first half year, in which monthly expenditures
had been allowed to continue at the rate of one twelfth of each
ministry’s total 1978 expenditure.
Even in the absence of a budget and in spite of certain disagree­
ments over the individual Emirates’ contributions to the federal
expenditure, the Federation was never in any danger of becoming
short of funds, as Abu Dhabi’s rapidly growing income from oil was
readily available to meet the expenditure of the federal government.
After the government of Abu Dhabi’s own expenditure at home, its
assistance to some of the smaller shaikhdoms, the large sums it
donated in grants to foreign governments, and its capital partici­
pation in projects of Third World countries, had been financed,
surpluses appeared which constituted a security enabling individual
Emirates’ governments, and even private citizens, to borrow money
abroad or at home for their own projects. Financially this new State
had few worries at home and it inspired great economic confidence
abroad. Such a solid financial backbone could not fail to make the
young federation a more successful enterprise than it might other­
wise have been.
Strategic use of foreign policy
Contrary to the advice of the British Foreign Office, which advo­
cated a period of consolidation at home before venturing onto the
international stage, the UAE followed a forward strategy in its
foreign policy right from the start. Like Bahrain and Qatar it applied
for and obtained membership of the UN and the Arab League at the
earliest possible date, partly because this is considered a symbol of
statehood. The UAE subsequently joined most of the UN organis­
ations and affiliates as well as regional Arab and Islamic organis­
ations, even though it could not, for the time being, co-operate fully
with them for lack of trained personnel. By March 1975 UAE
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