Page 362 - UAE Truncal States_Neat

The Formation of the Federation

Following the devaluation of the pound sterling in autumn 1967,
withdrawal from east of Suez appeared to be inevitable, yet the
British Government still intended to meet its treaty obligations vis-a-
vis the Gulf Stales. In November 1967 a Foreign Office Minister, Mr
Goronwy Roberts, visited the Shah of Iran and the Rulers in the Gulf,
assuring them that in the interests of stability in the Gulf region the
British military presence would be maintained at all its traditional
bases. But in a speech in the House of Commons the Prime Minister
announced on 16 January 1968 further drastic expenditure cuts and
the intention to withdraw completely by the end of 1971. He said:
“We have also decided to withdraw our forces from the Persian Gulf
by the same date.”4 In the meantime between 8 and 11 January Mr
Goronwy Roberts had returned to the Gulf to break this news to his
incredulous hosts.
Thus, internal British and Labour Party politics, not the initiation
of a particular foreign policy, brought about this completely new
situation in all the Gulf States.

The technicalities of withdrawal
Initial despondency over the decision was felt as intensively by the
British diplomats serving in the area as by the Rulers. The latter had
just experienced two decades during which the altitude of Britain
had developed from aloofness and an occasional show of gunboat
power to a humanitarian interest in these Stales. The Rulers could
then look forward to enjoying the new wealth from oil under British
protection and guidance. On the diplomats, many of whom had
endeavoured for years to understand the Arab way of life, fell the
unenviable task of explaining what was seen as the British
Government’s breach of written agreements and the unwritten Arab
law of trust and friendship. They also had to grapple with the
technicalities of handing over military, political, legal and ad­
ministrative. responsibilities; in some States there were as yet no
appropriate institutions to assume these responsibilities.
The British Government hoped that in spite of the tight
withdrawal schedule the transition from British tutelage to complete
autonomy would be effected smoothly in all the States. It was
considered by some that localised unrest was probably a bigger risk
at that time than the risk of upsetting the global balance of power,
and of the Soviet Union gaining access to the Gulf. A number of
disputes had to be settled before the British Government could claim
that the withdrawal would not cause the disruption which was
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