Page 104 - Historical Summaries (Persian Gulf - Vol II) 1907-1953

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119. Most of the frontier incidents arose out of the intensive smuggling from
Kuwait to Iraq and the efforts made by the Iraqis to stop it. In addition to
preventive measures on the frontier the Iraqis made many approaches on the
subject to His Majesty’s Embassy at Bagdad. Much advice was offered to the
Ruler but His Majesty’s Government declined to bring “pressure” to bear on
him as he was under no legal obligation to stop smuggling from his territory.
In 1935 he was urged amongst other things to appoint a British Director of Customs
who would introduce a system of manifests and take other steps to ensure that
goods for Kuwait did not evade the Iraqi customs authorities.(2aM) He politely
rejected this proposal. Not only did he fear the anger of Ibn Saud, whose request
for the appointment of a representative at Kuwait to regulate exports he had
refused, but he was unwilling to risk the local unpopularity which he would incur by
taking effective steps to stop the smuggling. At that time owing to the decline in
the pearl trade and the Saudi blockade Kuwait’s economy was at a very low ebb,
and though it was reported that the merchants themselves did not actively
participate in the smuggling they no doubt reaped much profit from the sale of
goods to those who did. The Ruler agreed to take some half measures but these
were unacceptable to the Iraqis who in 1935 proposed that a quota system for
imports should be applied to Kuwait which would be administered by a British
Director of Customs in conjunction with the Iraqi customs and that a joint Kuwait-
Iraqi preventive service should be formed.(“*) These proposals could pot be
accepted. The Iraqis in retaliation for the smuggling withdrew the draw-back
privilege which goods re-exported from Basra to Kuwait had previously enjoyed,(2,,u)
and from time to time threatened a blockade, which was never actually enforced,
while their press inveighed against Kuwait and clamoured for its incorporation in
Iraq. Conferences between Kuwait and Iraq were from time to time proposed and
in 1934 some Iraqi representatives visited Kuwait for informal discussion but the
Ruler refused to participate on the ground that he had not invited them-C’1)
Throughout the controversy he fought a very able defensive action and succeeded
in giving nothing away. A detailed note on contraband running from Kuwait
not only to Iraq but also to Saudi Arabia was prepared by the Political Agent at
Kuwait in 1933 and forwarded by the Political Resident to His Majesty’s
Government,(2ca) and the course of the controversy was described and discussed in a
Foreign Office Memorandum prepared in May 193 5(263) and in a despatch from the
Political Resident written in November of the same year.(2M) The controversy
continued for many years after this and Iraqi complaints extended not only to
the smuggling of merchandise but also to that of arms (paragraph 191 below).
The Iraqi Foreign Minister raised the question when he visited London in 1938
(paragraph 51 above). He alleged that the Iraqi Government were suffering a
loss of £250,000 a year in their customs revenue and, if His Majesty’s Government
were unwilling to agree to the incorporation of Kuwait in Iraq, proposed either
a Customs Union between Iraq and Kuwait, or the cession of a large portion of
Kuwait territory, or combined preventive operations.(2G5) None of these solutions
could be accepted.
120. No more success attended the efforts to deal with the frequent frontier
incidents. In 1936 the Political Resident proposed a mixed Commission to
investigate them but His Majesty’s Embassy at Bagdad did not favour the
proposal.(2CC) Early in 1937 a meeting was arranged at Safwan between the Iraqi
Commandant and British Inspecting Officer of Police at Basra and the Political
Agent to make enquiries into certain cases. The atmosphere of the meeting was
cordial but nothing appears to have resulted from it and His Majesty’s Ambassador
was unable to persuade the Iraqis to agree to further meetings.(26J) In 1939 it was
decided that to facilitate a solution of the problem it was desirable to demarcate the
frontier but efforts to persuade the Iraqi Government to agree to this failed
(paragraph 45 above). In the same year the Iraqis wished to send an envoy to
(«") l.O. toF.O. P.Z. 4125/1935 of June 17, 1935 (E 3722/127/91 of 1935).
(*■'•) Bagdad lo F.O. Despatch 72 of February 7, 1935 (E 1120/127/91 of 1935).
(,,B) Baghdad to F.O. Despatch 423 of July 30, 1935 (E 4861 /127/91 of 1935).
(’•’) l.O. to F.O. P.Z. 6183/34 of October 5. 1934 (E 6206/669/91 of 1934).
(*M) l.O. to F.O. P.Z. 3919/33 of July 4, 1933 (E3686/2079/91).
(*•*) (E 2908/127/91 of 1935.)
(=“) l.O. toF.O. P.Z. 8662/1935 of December 6. 1935 (E 7117/127/91 of 1935).
(a,a) F.O. to l.O. E 5705/75/91 of October 19, 1938.
(”*) Baghdad to F.O. Despatch 401 of August 4, 1936 (E 5338/38/91 of 1936).
(,,T) Baghdad to F.O. 280/4/37 of April 29. 1937 (E 2612/29/91 of 1937).